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TREATMENT PLANT/SEWER/OTHER INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

Oily/Greasy/Tarry Material in the Florence Avenue Trunk in Santa Fe Springs

On Thursday, 1-7-15 at 0700 hours, Supervising I.W. Inspector John Boyd received an e-mail from Supervising Engineering Technician Albert Steel of the Compton Field Office. The e-mail and a subsequent telephone conversation between Boyd and Steele reviewed a finding by Steele's sulfide crew, led by Engineering Technician III Cedric Jefferson, of black colored greasy/oily/tarry material about 2” thick in the channel of the 18” Florence Avenue Trunk in Santa Fe Springs at MH 18 1081 at 1400 hours the previous afternoon, see Figure 1 below. Steele said that although the material looked thick and oily/tarry, Jefferson had not reported a petroleum odor being present nor any elevated explosivity readings in the sewer headspace. Steele said this manhole (MH) used to be used for caustic addition by the Districts, but those activities ceased years ago. The manhole is now checked monthly for sulfides. Steele said he hadn't received any reports from his crew regarding seeing this same material during sulfide checks prior to 1-6-16.

Figure 1: 1-6-16 Florence Avenue Trunk MH 1081 photo of the 2” thick layer of black oily material in the sewer channel.

An investigation, led by Senior I.W. Inspectors Andy Woods and Kent McIntosh, as well as area I.W. Inspector Jason Finn, with the participation of I.W. Inspectors Sanjay Patel and Steve Lajkowicz, traced the material found at MH 1081 approximately three-quarters of a mile upstream to an oil field production facility operated by Breitburn Operating, L.P. This facility produces oil from wells using standard and fracking extraction techniques. Oil and brine produced from the wells is separated on-site, with the brine discharged to the sanitary sewer under permit with the Districts. The investigation determined the facility had discharged the tarry material found in the downstream trunk sewer due to an overflow of their air floatation “Wemco” treatment system tank into a surge tank that flows to the sewer. A sample of material floating on top of the Wemco tank was taken and compared to a sample of tarry material removed from the Florence Avenue trunk. GCMS analysis indicated the samples were a close match. Breitburn was issued a Notice of Violation for causing the incident. Breitburn representatives stated they will increase their diligence in operating and maintaining their treatment system to prevent a similar discharge from recurring.
West Basin MWD Brine Spill and Request for 1-Time Discharge

On Thursday, 1-14-16 at 1230 Hours, I.W. Inspector Shawn Cleaver received a telephone call from Cheryl Ross of the West Basin Municipal Water District (WBMWD). Ross reported that at approximately 1800 hours the previous evening a homeless man living in a makeshift encampment on the west embankment under the Carson Street Bridge where it crosses the Dominguez Channel set a fire trying to keep warm. The fire was set directly under the 14" above-ground HDPE “brine line” pipe operated by the WBMWD which conveys approximately 0.9 MGD of brine waste from the WBMWD water recycling facility at 21029 S. Wilmington Ave in Carson directly to the JWPCP surge tower for discharge into the Districts’ ocean outfall pipe system under contract No. 3702 signed by the WBMWD and the Districts on 11-10-1999. The fire damaged the line, causing brine to spill into the adjacent Dominguez Channel. Emergency repairs were immediately conducted by the WBMWD which included the placement of a 2-3’ section of steel sleeve over the damaged section of the line that night by the WBMWD. However, that fix was only intended as temporary and the line remained in need of a permanent repair. Ross called Cleaver to start the process of obtaining permission from the Sanitation Districts to dewater the line into a Districts’ or local sewer manhole to facilitate the line being repaired. WBMWD estimated the amount of water to be removed from the line and discharged to the sewer would be no more than 120,000 gallons, with a best estimate of the actual discharge being about 100,000 gallons. The information was forwarded to Supervising I.W. Inspectors John Boyd and David Sanchez, as well as I.W. Section Supervising Permit Engineer Linda Shadler.

Figures 2 and 3: 1-14-16 temporary repair sleeve installed on the damaged 14” brine line.

Initial reconnaissance by Sanchez indicated that a possible manhole location for the Districts to receive flow pumped from the brine line dewatering operations could be into a local sewer manhole located just upstream of MH 08 0205A on the Grace Street Trunk in Carson (see Figure 4).
Shadler and Boyd agreed the proper approach would be to issue West Basin a temporary permit to allow a 1-time discharge of the water generated from dewatering the brine line. Districts’ Waste Management Department Head Vicki Conway was apprised of the situation and concurred with the approach. West Basin officials subsequently also obtained permission from the local sewer authority, the L.A. County Department of Public Works, to discharge directly into the local sewer line manhole just upstream of MH 08 0205A. Although West Basin Representatives initially indicated they wanted to proceed with the dewatering operations as early as Friday, 1-15-16, the project was subsequently delayed by a problem finding a suitable section of 14” HDPE needed to make the repair, and then by a separate problem locating a portable pump capable of performing the dewatering operation. These delays resulted in the issuance of the temporary permit for the discharge being delayed several days. Ultimately, the temporary Permit (#21806) was issued on Tuesday, 1-19-16. The permit was given for a 2-week period with an expiration date of February 2, 2016. The permit was issued for a flow rate of 150,000 GPD, with a 5-minute peak flow limit of 200 gpm as determined after Shadler consulted with Compton Field Office Yard Supervising Engineer John Chung to insure no sewer overflow(s) would occur due to the discharge into the 12” Grace Street trunk at MH 205A.

The dewatering operation was subsequently completed without incident on Thursday, 1-28-16 at 2330 hours, after 41,000 gallons was removed from the line in about a 4.5 hour period. Note that this was the second attempt to dewater the line after the initial attempt during the evening hours of Tuesday, 1-19-16 had to be stopped at 2355 hours due to a rainstorm occurring. The temporary permit included several requirements to insure the project was completed with minimal danger to Districts’ operations. One requirement was that if rain began falling during the discharge, the flow would be stopped immediately to minimize the chance of a sewer overflow occurring due to excessive hydraulic loading occurring in the collection system. The 14” brine line was subsequently successfully repaired on Friday, 1-29-16 by a West Basin contractor. Supervising I.W. Inspectors David Sanchez and Barbara Jenkins, Senior I.W. Inspector Bill Barnum, as well as area I.W. Inspector Shawn Cleaver, and Night Team I.W. Inspector Kristopher McGinnis all dedicated significant effort and time to the completion of this project.
Figures 5 and 6: “Blow off” connection where a 3” diameter firehose is being used to tap into the water in the underground brine line and the same firehouse line as it discharges into the local discharge line manhole. Note the absence of any surcharging.
JWPCP LWDS Ocean Blue Rejected Load

On Friday, 1-15-16 at 1000 hours, JWPCP LWDS Attendant Paul Adams notified Supervising I.W. Inspector David Sanchez of an unusual 5000-gallon load hauled to the LWDS by Ocean Blue Environmental from a Hanjin Shipping Company facility at the Port of Long Beach. The load was unusually thick in consistency, so much so that the coliwasa tube used to take load qualification samples at the LWDS was unable to penetrate the load more than a couple of inches, preventing a sufficient sample from being collected. Adams also reported the load had a slight petroleum odor. Per the waste manifest submitted with the load the Hanjin facility address indicated was 301 Hanjin Road, Long Beach, CA 90802. Sanchez advised Adams to reject the load and then also requested area I.W. Inspector Sanjay Patel perform a site inspection at the Hanjin facility as soon as possible.

Patel inspected the Hanjin facility on 1-15-16 at 1345 hours. The inspection confirmed that Ocean Blue Environmental had been on-site earlier that same day servicing a small sewage lift station outside one of their buildings (see photos below) that had been completely full of accumulated heavy sanitary waste solids. According to the contact at Hanjin, Ocean Blue used pressure water and a fire hose to break up heavy sanitary solids that had accumulated in the lift station so that they could be vacuumed from the wet well. The contact stated no industrial waste flows into the lift station. Inspection of the wet well did not find any evidence to contradict this claim. The contact further stated the heavy accumulation of solids had caused the lift station pumps to fail. The contact indicated the lift station had not been opened for almost 15 years prior to that day as they had not had any issues with it previously. There are two other lift stations at the site. The Hanjin contact said those will now be considered for preventative maintenance operations to avoid similar failures.
Subsequent closer re-examination of the load sample at JWPCP on 1-15-16 indicated no petroleum odor was actually present. Attendant Adams admitted he may have misjudged the odor when he initially examined it, stating that he was pretty wound up when he checked the sample due to the failure of the Ocean Blue truck driver to obtain what he considered an acceptable sample of the load.

Given the results of Patel’s investigation, it was decided that if Ocean Blue Environmental wished, they would be allowed to return to the JWPCP LWDS and dump the load. The load was subsequently returned on Wednesday, 1-20-16 at 1339 hours, and dumped without incident.

Saugus WRP Grey Floating Material in Grit Chamber

On Tuesday, 1-19-16 at 0700 hours, area I.W. Inspector Anie Kellzi received an e-mail from Saugus WRP STPO Jeanine Gonzalez reporting that at 0500 hours that morning operators performing routine cleaning of the influent grit chamber and noticed "grey material" on the surface of the water. Gonzalez further stated that "maintenance crews have seen this before, but operators have not." Operators took a sample of the material and retained for the inspection staff to examine or and/or submit for lab analysis. Gonzales did not indicate that there was anything out of the ordinary operationally at the WRP.
Subsequent review of routine sewer crown spray notification e-mails by Supervising I.W. Inspector Dave Lee revealed that the Districts’ contractor "Norcal Pipeline Services" was scheduled to be working on the Soledad Canyon Relief Trunk from MHs 1191-1215 on Tuesday, 1-19-16 starting at midnight. These reaches of trunk sewer are directly upstream of the Saugus WRP. Lee left a voice mail message for contractor foreman Jeff Crawford to verify their operation location on 1-19-16.

At 0720 hours Kellzi spoke to Gonzalez on the phone. Kellzi asked Gonzales if she was aware of possible upstream crown spray activity. Gonzalez said that she had been told that the scheduled crown spray work had been delayed until Wednesday, 1-19-16. Gonzalez also stated that all recent indications of influent pH were around 7.0. At 0830 hours Gonzalez telephoned Kellzi back and stated that operators now believed that the grey material found in the grit chamber was in fact caused by crown spray activity earlier in the morning upstream of the WRP. Gonzalez said that rumors of the work having been rescheduled were investigated and been found to be untrue. Gonzalez stated there were no indications that there had been any abnormal effects on the treatment plant operations due to the crown spray activity. Given this information, the investigation by the I.W. inspection staff was ceased.

**Long Beach WRP High pH**

On Wednesday, 1-20-16 at 1330 hours, STPO Bob Dunn of the Long Beach WRP (LBWRP) called Supervising I.W. Inspector John Boyd. Dunn reported that the WRP was currently experiencing the second of two elevated pH episodes that had occurred that day. He said the first incident began at 1135 hours and ended 50 minutes later at 1225 hours with a maximum raw influent pH of 8. being reached about 20 minutes into the event. The second event began at 1256 hours and was still ongoing. Operators took a grab sample of raw influent at 1325 hours which tested at pH=8.7. Dunn said the pH was currently about 8.5-8.6 at 1330 hours. He said the incidents appear to be accompanied by a "reddish hue" being present in the primary tanks. He said as time has passed the color seems to be changing to a more brownish color. Dunn said he spoke with Albert Steele of the Compton Field Office and confirmed there was no caustic addition activity scheduled upstream of the WRP on 1-20-16. Dunn said he also confirmed there was no crown spray activity scheduled upstream of the WRP. A raw influent grab sample was taken and held in the lab refrigerator at the WRP for possible pick-up by I.W. inspectors. There are no unusual odors or foaming associated with the events. Supervising I.W. Inspector David Sanchez was notified of the report and coordinated the field response/investigation.
Senior I.W. Inspector Andy Woods lead the investigation. After establishing that there were no relevant upstream crown-spraying and/or caustic-dosing activities, day and night-shift I.W. inspectors inspected each of the five known significant potential industrial sources of high pH discharges tributary to the LBWRP. All five companies were determined to be in compliance and not the source of high pH WRP influent. Raw grab samples taken during the incident and the following day, during which WRP operating conditions were normal, revealed the influent samples taken on 1-20-16 had elevated magnesium concentrations. This kind of finding usually indicates magnesium hydroxide from crown spray activity entered the WRP. However, the described reddish/brown color does not fit the profile for magnesium hydroxide, and neither does the lack of scheduled crown spray activity upstream of the WRP on 1-20-16 noted previously. Subsequent discussions with Compton Field Office Engineer Patricia Hsia revealed that water jet cleaning on the J.O. ‘C’ unit 6C Renovation trunk line (which is upstream of the LBWRP) was conducted on 1-19-16, the day before the high pH incidents. Hsia noted that line had been crown-sprayed twice about two months earlier on 11-3-15 and again on 11-23-15. She said it was possible debris and/or residual magnesium hydroxide on the crown may have been washed into the sewer during the cleaning operations. I.W. inspectors believe there is a strong probability that the sewer cleaning operations caused these incidents. Subsequent visits to LBWRP by I.W. inspectors found normal operating conditions and pH levels. I.W. Inspectors will continue to monitor the WRP, sewer operations, and tributary industrial wastewater dischargers for unusual activities that could be related to these incidents.
Alta-Dena Dairy Milk Spill in the City of Industry

On Wednesday, 2-17-16 at 0830 hours, Supervising IW Inspector David Lee notified area IW Inspector Pat Cashen of a report on the California Office of Emergency Services website of a milk spill to the storm drain at Alta-Dena Certified Dairy in the City of Industry that occurred on Sunday, 2-14-16. The report stated that due to an equipment malfunction approximately 750 gallons of milk were spilled into the storm drain. Lee requested that Cashen follow-up with the company to determine if the sewer discharge was affected.

Figure 1: GIS diagram indicating location of the milk spill at the Alta-Dena Certified Dairy on 2-14-16.

Alta-Dena Certified Dairy, LLC  
17851 E. Railroad Street  
City of Industry CA, 91748  
IW 20639  287,500 GPD
Cashen inspected the Alta-Dena facility on Wednesday, 2-17-16. Per Yenny Khuu, Alta-Dena’s Environmental, Safety, and Health Manager, on Sunday 2-14-16 at about 1700 hours a spill occurred during the unloading of a milk tanker truck. The company's investigation determined that a high level monitor in the receiving milk silo failed, causing the milk to siphon from the overflow line into a room next to the pasteurizer unit. The room has two floor drains that discharge to the industrial wastewater treatment system. The flow was so great that an employee walking by the area observed milk flowing from under the doorway into the adjacent storm drain; the employee immediately had the driver cease unloading. The milk silo holds approximately 10,000 gallons and the company estimates that 750 gallons were discharged into the storm drain and another 750-800 gallons were discharged to the industrial wastewater treatment system. Due to it being a weekend and holiday (Monday, 2-15-16 was Presidents’ Day) there was a delay in reporting the incident. Review of the company's flow and pH recorders indicated there was no increase in flow, and pH levels were normal during the time of the incident, indicating that the slug discharge of milk to the treatment system was relatively limited and handled without issue. At the time of Cashen’s inspection the milk silo that overflowed was still offline. Cashen reviewed with company contacts the requirement that they notify the Districts of non-routine discharges such as occurred during this incident. The contacts stated that they had called the Sanitation Districts, leaving a notification voicemail message. However, upon further review, it was determine that the number they called was the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works stormwater hotline, not a Sanitation Districts number. Cashen provided them with the appropriate Districts’ notification telephone numbers and reviewed the notification procedures in their IW Permit requirement list. A Verbal Warning was issued for their failure to notify the Districts. Contacts said they will update their notification procedures. This facility discharges into the District 21 Interceptor trunk sewer, thus its flow bypasses the San Jose Creek East WRP and flows directly to the JWPCP. There was no impact on JWPCP operations due to the milk spill.

Los Coyotes WRP Brown Color

On Thursday, 2-18-16 at 1045 hours, Los Coyotes WRP TPO I Ryne Shay notified Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez of brown colored water in the WRP final effluent. Shay said the color was noticed at about 1030 hours and a sample was collected. Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods was notified and coordinated the investigation.

At 1050 hours Woods spoke with Supervising TPO II Michael Barker at LCWRP. Barker reported that aside from the faint brown color in the final effluent, there were no other operational problems, such as high or low dissolved oxygen levels in the secondary aeration tanks, unusual odors, or increased effluent turbidity levels. Woods picked up the final effluent grab sample taken by operators at 1025 hours. Inspector Sanjay Patel reported the secchi disk clarity at 7 knots; normal is around 9 or 10. At 1200 hours Woods spoke with TPO II Mike Nelson at LCWRP. Nelson reported that the influent flow rate was elevated the previous evening during a rain storm. Charts indicated the peak flow was 37.5 MGD; 29-30 MGD is normal.

At 1535 hours Night Team Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh spoke with swing-shift TPO II Rudy Fernandez at LCWRP. Although there was still some color in the effluent, it was diminishing and was completely gone by 1630 hours. No NPDES violations occurred due to the color.
Figure 2: Los Coyotes final effluent on 2-18-16 at 1117 hours. Note slight brown tint in the forebay waters.
Figure 3: HPLC sample results comparing LCWRP final effluent forebay color extract sample (sample 16022300295) to samples taken at Tri-Star Dyeing and Finishing (sample 16021900438) and Shaw Diversified Services (sample 16021900439). Districts’ laboratory analysts determined there was no definitive match in these results.

All permitted IW dischargers tributary to LCWRP and having a color component to their waste streams were inspected as part of this investigation, which in addition to Woods, Patel, and McIntosh, also included IW Inspector Jason Finn. No definitive source for the brown color was identified. However, Tri-Star Dyeing and Finishing, a textile dyeing operation, was issued a written notice of violation for a sample of their ongoing discharge failing a color limit test and for failing to properly maintain their required discharge sampling unit. Additionally, Shaw Diversified Services, a carpet manufacturing and dyeing operation, was issued a verbal warning for a retained sample of their discharge failing a color limit test. Unfortunately the times of discharge these samples represented did not correspond well with the suspected time the brown colored material entered the WRP. Furthermore, laboratory HPLC test results for color scan matches between the WRP’s final effluent which had the brown color, and the Tri-Star off-spec sample, as well as Shaw Diversified’s off-spec sample, were inconclusive (see Figure 3 above). No evidence of excessive color discharge was observed at the remaining industrial facilities that were investigated.

IW Inspectors strongly suspect discharge from Tri-Star Dyeing and Finishing caused this incident, but ultimately there was insufficient evidence to prove such. IW Inspectors are monitoring the Tri-Star facility closely and are working on improving investigative methods to improve the Districts’ ability to assign responsibility for these incidents and prevent their recurrence.

Tri-Star Dyeing and Finishing
15125 Marquardt Ave.
Santa Fe Springs CA, 90670

Shaw Diversified Services, Inc.
15305 Valley View Ave.
Santa Fe Springs CA, 90670

IW 17196 395,000 GPD
IW 15869 600,000 GPD
Lancaster LWDS Rejected Load

On Friday, 2-19-16 at 1415 hours, Lancaster LWDS Attendant Ben Large (x6505) called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that a 5000-gallon septic tank waste load just brought to the station by Shoemaker's Enviro-Tech had a slightly low pH of 5.6 (guideline is such septic loads should have pH of 6-8 to be accepted) and a TDS of 825 mg/l (guideline for acceptance is that the TDS for septic loads be <2000 mg/l). The load had an otherwise normal appearance (brown color) and odor for septic waste per Large. The load truck driver and the waste manifest indicated the load came from a McDonald's fast food restaurant in Littlerock, CA. Large asked if he should accept the load given the slightly low pH. Initially Boyd advised Large to accept the load, but after a call within a minute later that Boyd received from Lancaster WRP Supervising TPO Dan Shubin, it was decided to reject the load. Shubin expressed concern that given the low flow rates into the Lancaster WRP (as opposed to the large flow rates present at the JWPCP LWDS) such a 5000-gallon load could be problematic in terms of upsetting the much smaller Lancaster WRP. Given this logical position, Boyd concurred with Shubin's desire that the load be rejected. Shubin said he would speak to Large and have the load rejected. The hauler was advised to neutralize the load if they wished to bring it back for acceptance. Districts' records indicate the load was not returned to the Lancaster LWDS for disposal. Final disposition of the load is unknown.

Tesoro Carson Refinery Small Rag Fire

On Wednesday, 2-24-16 at 1635 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd spoke with Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins about a telephone call he received at 1625 hours from Robert Nguyen, EHS Environmental Manager of the Tesoro Carson Oil Refinery. Nguyen reported a small fire had occurred earlier that day at the refinery when some rags had caught on fire in a waste bin that resulted in 240 gallons of firewater being generated to extinguish it. It was stated that the firewater runoff had been segregated into lift station #4, and then into a holding tank. Nguyen requested that the discharge and testing of the firewater under requirement #7 in their approved Industrial Wastewater Discharge Permit Requirement List dated 11-07-2013 be waived due to the small amount of firewater generated. Boyd verbally denied this request. At Boyd’s direction to Nguyen, the impounded firewater must be tested and the test results sent to Boyd with a request to discharge it to the sewer assuming it meets applicable limits. If approval is gained, Tesoro operators will then pass the firewater through their regular wastewater treatment system and to Tank 95 (treated refinery wastewater holding tank) prior to discharge to the sewer. Night Team Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh responded to the call.

Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC    IW 21299    5,250,500 GPD
1801 E Sepulveda Boulevard
Carson, CA 90745

McIntosh responded on 2-24-16 at 1805 hours. He confirmed that earlier that day a small, hand-held Class ABC fire extinguisher and some water were used to extinguish a small rag fire that had started in a waste bin. Refinery operators believe the fire occurred due to spontaneous combustion in the bin. He noted the incident was almost identical to one that occurred here last year on 8-17-15 which generated 20,000 gallons of impounded firewater. The 2-24-16 fire was wholly contained within the waste bin, so only about 500 gallons of firewater was generated. The firewater was impounded into Tank 19 and analyzed for pH (8.4), oil & grease (23.4 mg/L), and flash point (> 200°F), all well within applicable limits. These results were e-mailed to Boyd on 2-26-16 and permission to discharge the impounded firewater was subsequently granted by Boyd. A follow-up inspection at the refinery on 3-4-16 by McIntosh found that the impounded firewater had yet to be discharged to the sewer. McIntosh found that other, normal process wastewater had been added to the tank to a volume of about 1.1 million gallons. Refinery contacts stated they intended to process and discharge the impounded firewater to the sewer shortly.
La Cañada WRP Low pH

On Monday, 2-29-16 at 1100 hours, IW Section Supervising Engineer Bill Cheyne received a telephone call from La Cañada WRP TPO II Johnny Gonzales who reported he was measuring an acidic pH of the plant influent at 6.2 with his handheld meter. Gonzales said he repeated the analysis using paper strips, which indicated pH=4.0. Cheyne asked Gonzales to collect a sample of the water and told him that he would contact area IW inspector Anie Kellzi who would respond to the WRP.

On 2-29-16 at 1140 hours Kellzi spoke to Cheyne and stated that she had spoken to Gonzales by telephone about the incident. Gonzales stated that he did not collect a sample because when he went to collect it, the pH had risen to 7.0. It also was revealed during the conversation that the low pH was actually measured in WRP effluent, not influent. Gonzales said he was no longer at the WRP, which was now locked and inaccessible. On 3-7-16 Kellzi conducted an inspection at the golf course country club facility, finding no evidence of unusual operations, such as draining or maintenance of the pool, which could have caused the 2-29-16 low pH incident.

La Cañada Flintridge Country Club
5500 N. Godbey Drive
La Canada Flintridge CA, 91011

Subsequently, on 3-9-16, Cheyne received a telephone call from Districts’ Superintendent of Upstream Treatment Plant Operations Pat Dial. Dial reported that further investigation on the part of WRP operations personnel into the 2-29-16 low pH incident at the La Cañada WRP appeared to indicate a strong likelihood that the low pH effluent was due to problems with the hypochlorite addition system within the WRP and not due to any low pH influent coming into the WRP. As such, the IW staff ceased conducting any further investigation into the low pH incident and a planned 24-hour sampling of WRP influent by Industrial Waste Section monitoring crew technicians which Dial had requested (and Cheyne had arranged for the next week) were cancelled.
Tip of Possible Unpermitted Textile Dyehouse in South Gate

On Tuesday, 3-1-16, Supervising Engineer Bill Cheyne received a forwarded e-mail that was originally sent to Districts' Wastewater Management Department Head Vicki Conway. A tipster reported a fabric dye and wash facility was operating at 8625 Otis Avenue in South Gate without an approved discharge permit. Information from the last Districts' inspection at that address in September 2000 indicated it was a dry foam and padding warehouse called "Mexi Form Products." The report was given to Supervising IW Inspector David Lee, who forwarded the information to area IW Inspector Steve Wittmer.

Wittmer inspected the facility on Thursday, 3-3-16 at 0900 hours. The facility was identified as R & J’s Fabrics Inc. The company had only been operating about two months. The company purchases used clothes which are then sorted and processed. The highest quality fabrics are sorted for color and content, and then cut for use as wiping rags. Most of the other fabric materials are baled for the domestic and overseas (primarily China) fiber recycling market. Most of the baled rags are ultimately ground up and used in roofing and insulation applications. Industrial wastewater is generated from washing a small portion of the some of the fabrics to maximize their value. Washing is conducted in two medium sized industrial washers of 450 and 250 lbs. capacity, respectively. No dyeing operations were noted on-site. Water bill calculations indicated the amount of industrial wastewater being sewered from washing the fabrics was only 184 gpd, well below the permit required flow guideline of 1 MGY (approximately 3200 gpd for a 6 day/week operation). The facility will be inspected annually for the next several years to insure the facility is issued a permit should the discharge volume exceed the amount at which a permit is required.

Elevated Explosivity Levels in 3 Trunk Sewer Manhole Headspaces in Carson

On Thursday, 3-10-16 at 1353 hours, Albert Steele, Supervising Engineering Technician at the Compton Field Office telephoned Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported high explosivity findings by his technician crew at the following 3 manhole headspaces within the previous 30 minutes:

1. MH A10; LEL=36% at 1328 hours.
2. MH B906; LEL=53% 1344 hours.
3. MH A1235; LEL=40% at 1350 hours.

Note that these 3 manholes are located either essentially at the JWPCP (B906, A1235) or just upstream of it (A10). Boyd asked Steele if there were any other unusual conditions, i.e., petroleum odors, at the JWPCP associated with the findings and Steele replied he knew of none.

Boyd contacted Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum at 1355 hours. Barnum said he was already on-site at JWPCP. After hearing the details of the report, Barnum noted that in his very experienced opinion, it was not unusual for elevated explosivity at these levels to be present at Manholes (MHs) A10 and B906; however, the reported 40% LEL at the J.O. ‘B’ headworks raised his concern. Barnum verified that the combustible gases were indeed elevated at the J.O. ‘B’ headworks after measuring 27% LEL with his Gastech GP-204 meter and noting that the plant sensor was measuring a comparable 25% LEL. He also noted there was an unusually strong raw sewage odor present throughout the primary treatment area which he thought was likely to be due to an interruption in the plant's odor control system. He contacted JWPCP Supervising TPO Gus Caro about this and confirmed that one of the main blowers was off. Caro immediately dispatched an operator to return the blower to service. Caro then stated that the failure of the blower was probably the cause of elevated explosivity at the headworks. Barnum rechecked the headworks approximately one hour later and found the headspace gases had returned to normal explosivity levels. At no time during the incident were there any elevated combustible gases detected in the secondary reactors, nor were there any odors or visual cues
which would indicate the presence of a petroleum distillate or similar material impacting the plant. It is likely that the failure of the odor control unit caused headspace gases, which are typically high in methane, to concentrate in the headworks forebay. No further investigation was conducted.

Whittier Narrows WRP Blue Color

On Wednesday, 3-16-16, Supervising TPO Carlos Alfaro of the Whittier Narrows WRP left a voicemail message for IW Inspector Jim Percy. Alfaro stated that some blue color had been noticed the previous Sunday and Monday (3/13-14) on laboratory filter paper during routine plant process water analysis. On 3/17, inspector Percy spoke on the phone Alfaro, and was told that the color was never seen in the plant by operators, but was noticed by laboratory personnel on white filter media during normal wastewater testing (see Figure 1 below). Some settled blue residue was also noticed in buckets but not reported by lab personnel at the time. There were no associated operational changes or effects noted. Dissolved oxygen concentrations, as well as turbidity and pH levels were all normal.

Multiple inspections at possible industrial color dischargers upstream of the treatment plant were conducted but failed to find any industrial source of the unusual blue color in the secondary treatment solids. Due to the fact that there didn’t appear to be any evidence of the blue color in the primary or raw samples, inspectors began to suspect that the color may have been created within the plant. Microbiological analysis of samples taken from the secondary tanks did not conclusively identify the source of the color, but did indicate that an unusual blue-green colored bacterial growth, of unknown origin, was present in the water. This growth was apparently being consumed by the normal protozoa population in the water which then took on the color of material they had consumed. These protozoa were the blue-colored particulates present on the filter papers subsequently noticed and reported by lab personnel. Ultimately, within a week the condition subsided. At no time did WRP operators report any deleterious effects on the plant’s overall treatment processes and no NPDES violations resulted from the incident. IW inspectors will check with WRP operators and lab personnel periodically in case this unusual condition occurs again.

Figure 1: 0.45µ membrane filters with blue-green colored particulates noted on 3-13-16 (left) and from a previous secondary effluent sample when the blue-green color was absent (right).
Figure 2: 3-16-16 WNWRP secondary effluent with blue green particulates present.
Figure 3: 20X microscope image of blue-green material in secondary effluent.

Figure 4: 200X microscopic of a ciliated protozoon from the WNWRP secondary effluent exhibiting a blue-green color.
Lancaster WRP High Secondary Effluent Turbidity

On Monday, 3-14-16 at 0703 hours, Lancaster WRP Supervising Treatment Plant TPO II Rafael Rivas called John Boyd and reported that the treatment plant had experienced two high turbidity incidents over the previous weekend. He said operators received a high turbidity alarm on Sunday, 3-13-16 and when operators arrived at the WRP at 0630 hours on Monday, 3-14-16, they found “sludge floating on the tanks.” Operators estimate the material that caused these incidents came into the plant at 1930 hours on Saturday, 3-12-16, and then again 24 hours later. Note the WRP has no influent pH meter, so it’s unknown if there were any pH excursions associated with the incidents. Note that similar incidents of high turbidity lasting about a week have occurred at about this same time of year over the past two years at the Lancaster WRP. Despite conducting concerted investigations, IW inspectors were unable to identify any source(s) for those incidents.

In response to the latest reported elevated turbidity in the secondary effluent, Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy and area IW Inspector Steve Lajkowicz conducted multiple inspections at IW dischargers upstream of the Lancaster WRP. They also submitted WRP samples for laboratory analysis. No evidence of any unusual activity or discharges was found at any of the industrial facilities inspected, including the Lancaster State Prison facility. The WRP sample results did not provide any clues as to the cause of the elevated turbidity treatment issues. Inquiries were made to both the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale about possible sewer line maintenance activity such as root or pest control operations in the upstream sewers, but they reported no unusual activity. The investigation was also made challenging by the fact that there appeared to be nothing unusual in the treatment plant influent such as changes in pH, color, solids or any other physical characteristics that inspectors could use as a guide in their search. WRP operators reported that after approximately six days, the turbidity levels in the secondary tanks returned to normal. IW inspectors will continue to monitor plant operations and the local area for new IW dischargers in case the situation returns.

Diesel Fuel Odor Emanating from San Gabriel Valley Field Office Shower Drains

On Wednesday, 3-16-16 at 1530 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from San Gabriel Valley Field Office (SGVFO) Supervising Engineer Abdul Edouni. Edouni reported a strong diesel fuel odor noticed had been noticed in the West Covina facility's locker room at 1500 hours. Personnel on-site ran water into the locker room shower drains in case the P-trap in the drain line had run dry, allowing the odors into the building. At 1540 hours, SGVFO Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance Bill Balas called Boyd. Balas reported he had detected the same odor at the local sewer manhole located in the street in front of the SGVFO building. Balas stated a pen light explosivity detector he used at the local manhole had registered a positive reading. Boyd requested a confirmation reading be obtained using a gas meter that could provide an explosivity percentage reading as opposed to the simple yes/no result provided by the pen device. Balas agreed. Boyd turned over the incident investigation to night Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins and informed Balas of the change in contact. At 1605 hours, Balas telephoned Jenkins with an update. He said the odor remained in the bathroom and that he was presently at the local sewer manhole noted above with the odor persisting with an explosivity concentration of 3% as measured through the manhole cover pick hole. Balas subsequently removed the manhole cover and checked the explosivity concentration at various depths in the headspace. He noted all explosivity levels were then 0%. He stated the odor had reminded him of one he’d regularly noted years ago when performing routine sewer maintenance downstream of the now defunct Powerine oil refinery in Santa Fe Springs. Balas said he would wait for investigating IW inspectors to arrive on-site to provide assistance and answer questions.

Night Team Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh and night IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis conducted the initial investigation, which was continued the next day by area IW Inspector Pat Cashen and IW Inspector Peter Carlstrom.
Figure 5: Area diagram showing the San Gabriel Valley Field Office in West Covina, as well as area sewer lines and nearby businesses that were considered potential sources for the diesel fuel odor reported emanating from shower drains at the SGVFO on the afternoon of 3-16-16.

Approximately 10 industrial and commercial users located near the SGVFO were inspected during the investigation. IW Inspectors did not note the presence of any unusual or diesel fuel like odors at any time during the investigation. No source for the odor reported was identified. It was noted during the investigation that there was a gas trap valve installed on the SGVFO sewer line where it joins the downstream local sewer line (see Figure 6). However, inspection of the valve found it had been wired open due to its having caused flow back-ups into the building. Unfortunately, wiring it open made it easier for sewer gas odors to make their way back into the building. Filling the shower drain line P-trap with water appears to have helped stopped sewer gases from getting into the building, thus addressing the immediate issue of foul odors entering the building’s shower area.
Figure 6: Gas trap valve on the SGVFO sewer line (entering from the 1:00 o’clock position) found wired open on 3-17-16.

Excessive Flaring at the ExxonMobil Torrance Oil Refinery

On Wednesday, 3-16-16 at 1830 hours, Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum telephoned Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins to report excessive flaring was ongoing at the ExxonMobil refinery in Torrance. He was able to observe this incident from his South Bay home. Such flaring can be an indicator of major operational problems occurring at the refinery, which can in turn indicate an elevated risk of off-spec industrial wastewater discharges to the sewer also occurring.

ExxonMobil Oil Corporation
3700 W. 190th Street
Torrance, CA 90503

ExxonMobil Oil Corporation
3700 W. 190th Street
Torrance, CA 90503

ExxonMobil Oil Corporation  IW#516  4,165,000 GPD

ExxonMobil Oil Corporation  IW#1148  1,192,000 GPD
Night team IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis went to the refinery on the evening of 3-16-16 to investigate Barnum’s report. He arrived on-site at 2000 hours. He was told a power outage had occurred at the refinery at 1720 hours due to a Mylar balloon contacting nearby power lines. Per refinery operators, after a two second power “bump,” all refinery systems had failed. When the power was restored shortly thereafter, some systems automatically came back on-line, but most systems linked to pumps did not, thus causing large amounts of oil, gas, and partially refined product to be automatically diverted to the flaring system, causing the huge flame noted by Barnum (see Figure 7 above). At the time of McGinnis’ inspection, the refinery was still in the process of manually activating and bringing on-line all required systems. Fortunately, the power outage did not affect the industrial wastewater pretreatment systems adversely and no off-spec wastewater discharges occurred at either the Van Ness outfall (IW#516) or the Del Amo outfall (IW#1148). McGinnis did issue a verbal warning for the Del Amo outfall because the company had failed to manually test and record hourly pH readings when the pH recorder had failed for two hours after the power outage. According to the flow log, there had been discharge to the sewer until 2008 hours. At the Van Ness outfall, the pH recorder was also non-functional for about two and a half hours after the power failure, but operators had taken and recorded hourly pH readings as required. There was no adverse impact to the downstream treatment plant, JWPCP, from this incident. A follow-up inspection the next morning by IW Inspectors Tingting Wei and Shawn Cleaver found normal refinery operations had resumed.

Elevated Explosivity in J.O.’C’ Trunk Sewer in Carson

On Wednesday, 3-30-2016 at 1251 hours, Compton Field Office Supervising Engineering Technician Albert Steele sent an e-mail to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd reporting a high explosivity concentration (LEL=44%) finding by his technician crew at MH C-35* in Carson at
1102 hours that day. Note that this manhole is located essentially adjacent to the IW outfall for the Tesoro Wilmington oil refinery (IW#20098). Boyd called Steele back a short time later and asked him if this reading was unusual after speaking with Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum, who stated that this manhole represents the end of the forcemain from the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant. In Barnum's opinion, a 44% reading would not be unusual at this location. Steele stated that his technicians check the manhole regularly and 44% represents the highest reading they've seen in 2016, with the previous readings ranging from 8-41%. Boyd contacted Night Inspection Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins who coordinated the investigation.

*On Monday, 4-4-2016, Albert Steele confirmed (via e-mail) with Night Team Supervising Team IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins that the reported MH C-35 with the high LEL was actually MH C-31 (See Figure 8 diagram below which indicates 4 manholes are located within a very small area, causing the confusion as to which manhole is which).

Figure 8: J.O. ‘C’ trunk sewer manhole cluster adjacent to the Tesoro Wilmington refinery outfall in Carson.

Night Team Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh and IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis investigated the report. At 1810 hours the explosivity concentration in MH C-31 was found by McGinnis and McIntosh to be 30%. No unusual odors were detected. The three main IW suspects for causing elevated explosivity at this location were inspected. None of these 3 see list below, was found to be the source of this incident.

1. Chemoil Terminals – IW#21564 - a batch discharger that was found to not be discharging.
2. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners – IW#15837 - although discharging to the sewer, the final effluent LEL recorder had shown no high LEL recordings.
3. Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC – IW#20098 - no discharge to the sewer over the last 12+hours because an earlier complete discharge from their wastewater storage tank had ceased at 0500 hours on 3-30-16.

Ultimately, IW inspectors were unable to identify a source for the elevated explosivity in MHs C-31 on 3-30-16. IW inspectors remain vigilant to any sources that could be contributing to high explosivity at this location. There were no reports of problems at the downstream Districts’ treatment plant, JWPCP.
INDUSTRIAL WASTE SECTION
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 2016

TREATMENT PLANT/SEWER/OTHER INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

Referral Regarding Possible Illicit Discharger in La Mirada

On Friday, April 1, 2016 at 0737 hours, Districts' Public Information Section Engineer Wendy Wert forwarded an e-mail to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd that she had received on the Districts' fraud/suspicious activity reporting website link. The e-mail was sent on Thursday, March 31, 2016 at 1530 hours by Sean Phan of the L.A. County Fire Departments' Health Hazmat Materials Division. Phan stated that he had recently inspected a new business, Outlook Resource, DBA Leftbank Art, located at 14821 Artesia Blvd and also at 14535 Industry Circle, both in La Mirada, CA 90638. Phan noted the facility does art reproduction/painting, with the equipment/brush rinsing wastewater generated being discharged into large multi-compartment sinks connected to the sanitary sewer. He also noted the company contact as Operations Manager Mr. Shawn Kim (714-851-4453). A review of the iPACS database by Boyd found no indication the facility had ever been inspected by Districts' IW staff.

Area IW Inspector Traci Stahl conducted inspections at both facilities on April 5, 2016. She confirmed the operations on-site were as noted by Inspector Phan and that the company was generating and sewerering limited quantities (<50 gpd) of industrial wastewater from washing paint brushes contaminated with non-toxic paint residuals at a small wash booth at the Industry Circle facility. She is currently waiting for the company to provide her with their water bills to confirm the low industrial wastewater flow rate. The company is very likely to be determined to be permit exempt due to the non-hazardous/non-toxic nature of the paints used and the low volume of wastewater being generated and sewerered.

Los Coyotes WRP Foam

On Friday, April 8, 2016 at 1655 hours, Mike Hunter, TPO I at LCWRP spoke with night Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins about excessive white “surfactant” foam he found at the secondary tanks/final effluent/forebay/weir during his routine plant rounds near the beginning of the swing shift (see figure 1). Note that no foam was found at the filters, which Hunter had expected. Neither was any foam present in the primary tanks. Later it was stated that the color of the wastewater in the plant was slightly more brownish and not the usual grey to black color. Operations increased the defoamant dosage at the forebay in response to the incident. No foam was noticed in the San Gabriel River receiving waters (see figure 2). WRP influent pH was normal, but final effluent turbidity was elevated at 2.5 NTU (normal is 0.5 NTU). No data for COD/suspended solids levels in primary effluent were available during the investigation, but secondary dissolved oxygen levels appeared to be normal. Hunter measured six feet of water clarity at the effluent forebay using a Secchi disk. Normal clarity/visibility is about 10 feet. Hunter stated the elevated turbidity was probably due to a scheduled shutdown that occurred at LCWRP earlier that morning at 0300 hours in order to facilitate work on an air-line mechanical seal. The WRP came back on-line on at 0830 hours. Due to the plant shut down, the diversion gate was opened and flow was diverted to JWPCP. According to Hunter, he has been involved in many plant shut downs at the Districts, but he has never seen this amount of foam generated due to one. Lastly, Hunter noted that a stop log was installed upstream of LCWRP sometime earlier that week or the previous week, resulting in influent flowrates lower than usual at 24-25 MGD versus a normal of 28-30 MGD. Operators took two grab samples, one at the forebay, and a second at the underflow weir.
Night IW Inspectors Kristopher McGinnis and Neil Tran investigated the incident. Eight companies were inspected with operations that included transportation and equipment cleaning, industrial and linen laundry, chemical manufacturing of cleaning products, fabric dyeing, and carpet dyeing and manufacturing. Of these companies, three (Crothall Laundry Services, Inc.; G & K Services, Co.; Tri-Star Dyeing and Finishing) were found to have varying degrees of white foam at their legal sampling points. At each of these three facilities, inspectors collected a sample that was submitted for HPLC scan analysis in an attempt to match it to the sample taken from the LCWRP forebay. Ultimately none of the results indicated foam causing surfactants present and the HPLC scan results were inconclusive. Despite the lack of matching results, inspectors feel it’s very likely the discharge from G & K Services was the likely cause (see figure 3 photo) due to its amount. A Notice of Violation was issued to G & K Services by Inspector McGinnis for discharging excessive foam into the sewer. At McGinnis’ direction, the company shut down their production line and ceased discharge to the sewer. After the company manually added defoamant to the wastewater the company resumed normal operations. No
definitive cause for the discharge of the excessive foam at the company was identified. No NPDES violation resulted from this incident.

G & K Services, Co.    IW 12362    97,000 GPD
14700 Spring Avenue
Santa Fe Springs, CA  90670

Figures 3 & 4: G & K Services legal sample point. Left photo shows ≈ 2’ of foam in the sample point vault at 8:15 p.m. on April 8, 2016. Right photo taken 20 minutes later shows the vault after defoamant was added.

Long Point Pumping Plant High Flow

On Tuesday, April 12, 2016 at 0200 hours, Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins, who was not on-duty at the time, realized she had a voicemail message on her Districts' cell phone. The message was left at 2149 hours on Monday, April 11, 2016 by Long Beach Alarm Center Senior Pumping Plant Operator Randy Bones, who stated he was calling to inform her that he'd received alarms from the Districts' Long Point Pumping Plant in Rancho Palos Verdes earlier in the evening indicating that excessive flows were coming into the pumping plant such that both the primary and standby pumps had activated. A Compton Yard operator had been dispatched to the pumping plant and he determined the flow was due to excessive flows from the Terranea Resort draining a 150,000 gallon swimming pool into the sewer due to a "big accident". Bones said he was notifying Jenkins of the incident in case IW staff was concerned about chemicals being present in the flow. Jenkins tried to call Bones back at 0205 hours on April 12, 2016, but he was unavailable. Jenkins then sent an e-mail to Team 3 Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez and Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd at 0239 hours on April 12, 2016 informing them of the incident. Upon arriving at work the next morning, Boyd and Sanchez received the e-mail from Jenkins at 0720 hours. It was agreed by Boyd and Sanchez that Team 3 IW inspectors would conduct a follow-up inspection at the Terranea Resort facility, located at 100 Terranea Way, Rancho Palos Verdes, to collect more information and cite the resort for unauthorized discharge if appropriate. Boyd then contacted Compton Yard Superintendent Doug Walton to see if there was any indication a sewer overflow had occurred due to this incident. Walton indicated no such overflow had occurred.
On April 12, 2016, Area IW Inspector Shawn Cleaver, as well as Team 3 Inspectors Tingting Wei and Chris Mendoza, conducted an inspection at the Terranea resort facility. Cleaver ultimately issued the facility a Notice of Violation for violating Districts’ Wastewater Ordinance Section 305: Discharge of rainwater, stormwater, groundwater or any other uncontaminated or contaminated water without prior approval. It was determined that Terranea had discharged approximately 120,000 gallons of pool water to the sanitary sewer without an industrial wastewater discharge permit or prior Districts’ approval. It was stated by Roye Mbarah, Director of Engineering at Terranea, that a resort guest had cut themselves on broken glass in the main pool on April 11, 2016. Resort personnel wanted to locate and remove the broken glass and decided they needed to drain the pool to do so, as the glass was virtually impossible to see through the pool’s water column. As such, but not knowing what proper notifications to make, resort personnel pumped the pool water to the sanitary sewer using their existing pool cleaning equipment with the end goal of removing any broken glass from the emptied pool. During this process, the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant received excessive flow alarms at both Districts’ Long Point Pumping Plant and Sea Cove Pumping Plant. At the direction of Districts’ Pumping Plant Operator Armando Torres, Mr. Mbarah ceased the discharge of pool water to the sewer at 2100 hours on April 11 until off-peak hours that night. Terranea resumed discharge to the sewer at 2300 hours on April 11. On April 12, IW inspectors observed resort personnel pumping residual pool water into surface drains around the pool area that connect to the storm water system with no pool water being discharged to the sanitary sewer. As a point of interest, note that The Terranea resort is located on the land once occupied by Marineland of the Pacific on the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Marineland closed in February 1987.
Anonymous Tip Alleging Illicit Dumping at a Truck Stop in Castaic

On Monday, April 11, 2016 at 0805 hours, Industrial Waste Section Head Dave Snyder forwarded an e-mail string that originated with the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd. The e-mail contained a web link to DTSC’s online tip reports. DTSC received a citizen tip at 1130 hours on Wednesday, April 6, 2016, that diesel exhaust fluid solution, (known as "DEF") is being dumped into the sewer at the Castaic Truck Stop, located at 31611 Castaic Road in Castaic, CA. DEF is a non-hazardous diesel engine additive solution that reduces NOx in the engine exhaust. It’s made simply by mixing a 2:1 solution of deionized water and dry urea. The tipster also alleged that waste cooking oil is dumped into the DEF tank as well. The information and web link was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee, who coordinated the investigation.
Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy and Area IW Inspector Anie Kellzi investigated the tip on April 14, 2016. Their investigation found no evidence that DEF was being discharged to the sewer although it does appear DEF was being illicitly made and sold on-site. The tip appears to have been sent to multiple agencies. The owner stated he has been inspected by "everyone under the sun" including the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works (LADPW), and County building inspectors in the past weeks. The investigation revealed the facility has a previously undocumented recreational vehicle (RV) disposal station, which is required to be permitted both by the LADPW and the Districts. Per standard procedures, Kellzi issued the facility a permit for the disposal station and required that equipment deficiencies at the station be corrected. These
included installing a backflow prevention device, hose, containment berm, Districts’ warning sign, and drain cap lock. Follow-up inspection on May 3, 2016 verified all deficiencies were corrected properly. The facility owner said he’s in the process of attempting to get all required permits and approvals necessary to manufacture the DEF solution on-site, until then the facility has ceased all DEF manufacturing operations. No referrals to other agencies will be made at this time.

![Image of RV Disposal Station at the Castaic Truck Stop following completion of corrections on May 3, 2016.](image)

**Figure 9:** RV Disposal Station at the Castaic Truck Stop following completion of corrections on May 3, 2016.

**Petroleum Odor in Torrance**

On Wednesday, April 14, 2016 at 1030 hours, South Coast Air Quality Management District Air Quality Inspector Steve Tsumura telephoned Senior IW Inspector Barnum and reported an odor complaint had been received from an employee at Liquid Genomics, which is located at 1725 Del Amo Boulevard in Torrance. The employee reported that a petroleum odor had been coming from a floor sink in the business for the past year. Inspector Tsumura said he had gone to the facility to investigate, but had been unable to confirm the odor and was asking for assistance from the Sanitation Districts.

Barnum inspected the facility on April 14, 2016 and then again on April 28, 2016 in response to a call he received from the facility contact reporting the odor had returned on April 22, 2016. However, Barnum was unable to verify the petroleum odor was present either visit. Barnum thinks the odor may have been mitigated by filling the restroom p-trap with water on April 22, 2016 per his earlier suggestion on April 14, 2016 and installing a Sure Seal gas trap in the laboratory floor drain. Barnum encouraged the facility to contact him again if the odor returns.
Anonymous Tip Alleging Illicit Dumping at a Food Manufacturer in Carson

On Tuesday, April 19, 2016 at 1230 hours, an anonymous voicemail tip was left for JWPCP Supervising Engineer Steve Krait. The tipster provided no contact information. He alleged that Bakkavor Foods USA (IW#20376) in Carson is illicitly dumping "sludge" during nighttime hours into the sewer. He also alleged that critical facility equipment such as pumps are out of service. Krait was unable to forward the actual voicemail message to IW staff at JAO due to ongoing issues with the JWPCP telephone system. Instead, he contacted IW Section Head Dave Snyder and IW Enforcement Supervising Engineer Bill Cheyne and played it out loud to them over his speaker phone such that Snyder and Cheyne could hear it. Cheyne then sent an e-mail with the tip message information to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd with a request that a follow-up investigation be conducted. Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez coordinated the investigation.

Bakkavor Foods USA IW 20376 36,100 GPD
18201 Central Avenue
Carson, CA 90746

Area IW Inspector Shawn Cleaver investigated this tip. He inspected the facility on April 20, 2016 at 0900 hours. The company makes food products including sauces, dips, desserts, soups, and dressings for both retail sale and restaurant use. The facility operates 24-hours per day with two production shifts and one nighttime cleaning shift. Review of company production operations, ongoing wastewater discharge, wastewater generating operations, operation and status of their industrial wastewater pretreatment system which includes a dissolved air floatation (DAF) unit, as well as review of their waste disposal and hauling records indicated no evidence of problems or illicit sewer discharges. The site contact did not report any unusual recent occurrences at the facility except that the facility’s sanitation manager had left the company approximately two weeks prior to the inspection. No further action on the tip is anticipated.

Sanitary Sewer Overflow in Long Beach

On Wednesday, April 20, 2016 at 1630 hours, Joe Burress of the Long Beach Water Department, Sewer Division, called the IW Section at JAO and spoke with Customer Service Representative, Bianca Najera. Burress stated that his agency had an industrial wastewater permit with the Districts which included time restrictions such that discharge was only allowed during off-peak hours (midnight to 6:00 a.m.). He said he was calling to see if he could obtain permission to discharge wastewater outside that time frame. Not realizing that the request was related to a sewer spill that had occurred the previous day and was essentially a request to discharge immediately, Najera forwarded the call to IW Enforcement Supervising Engineer Bill Cheyne's voicemail, assuming Cheyne would handle the request the next morning when he returned to work. Burress proceeded to leave Cheyne a more detailed message containing more information about the situation than he'd conveyed to Najera. Burress stated that due to a local sanitary sewer overflow (SSO) at 4th Street and Monrovia Avenue in Long Beach, sanitary wastewater had accumulated in storm drain diversion structures associated with a LACSD permitted dry weather flow diversion structure adjacent to the Colorado Lagoon in Long Beach. He said he was calling to obtain permission to activate the diversion system pumps to avoid the possibility of further dry weather flow getting into the dry weather diversion system structures (vaults), which could result in the sanitary wastewater in the vaults getting into the lagoon. Cheyne checked his voicemail upon arrival at work the next morning and immediately forwarded the information to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd for follow-up by the inspection staff. Boyd tried to call Burress to obtain more information, but was only able to leave a message for him asking for a call back. South Teams Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez was contacted and coordinated follow-up activity on the call, including the immediate dispatching of Area IW Inspector Sanjay Patel to the Colorado Lagoon dry weather diversion system (IW#20601).
Figure 10: April 22, 2016 at 1129 hours. Ocean Blue Environmental Services contract crew cleaning up stormwater vault located just upstream of the Colorado Lagoon in Long Beach.

Patel and Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods responded to the scene of the incident to obtain additional details about the SSO. Upon arrival, Patel spoke with City of Long Beach Water Department Sewer Supervisor Joe Quiroz. Quiroz indicated that the SSO occurred on Tuesday, April 19, 2016 at 2200 hours near 6th Street and Monrovia Avenue; he stated the SSO was caused by a tree root blockage. He further stated that Ocean Blue Environmental Services had been called out to pump out the sewage contaminated storm water from a storm water system vault and that they would not be needing to use the dry weather diversion system sewer connection to discharge the contaminated water. The amount of sewage in the storm drain vault was estimated to be 500-700 gallons and it appeared that fortunately no sewage or contaminated storm water made it to the downstream Colorado Lagoon. When asked where the contaminated stormwater and sewage was being hauled for disposal, it came to light that Ocean Blue had been given verbal approval by a Long Beach City Manager to discharge it into a sewer manhole adjacent to Ocean Blue’s main facility in Long Beach at 925 W. Esther Street. Districts’ IW Inspectors confirmed the discharge had occurred at that location and verified a City Manager had verbally approved it. The appropriateness and legality of granting such an approval is currently under review by IW Section staff and managers. Further follow-up on this issue may need to be conducted. The incident did not adversely impact Districts’ sewers or operations.

Sand Release into Local Sewer by Owens Corning in Compton

On Wednesday, April 20, 2016 at 1350 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from Long Beach Pumping Plant Alarm Center Operator Carlos Moreno. Moreno reported that he had just received a call from Compton Fire Department Hazardous Materials Investigator “Penn.” Penn reported that he was responding to a situation at Owens Corning in Compton where the company had reported an accident on-site that resulted in a large amount of sand overflowing into the sewer. There is concern the sand may cause a blockage or surcharging in the downstream sewer line(s). Moreno said that prior to contacting Boyd, he had also notified Compton Field Office Sewer Maintenance Supervisor William Foley, who was sending a sewer maintenance crew to respond to the scene. Moreno said initial review of the downstream sewer configuration indicated the company discharges into an 8” city of Compton local line that flows for about 1000' before it feeds into a 33” District’s trunk sewer (Bullis Road-Temple Street Relief Trunk). Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez was contacted and coordinated the follow-up investigation.
Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum and IW Inspector Shawn Cleaver arrived at the Owens Corning facility on April 20, 2016 at 1430 hours. The inspection determined that a long term accumulation of sand discharged into the sewer by the facility had gradually built up in the both in the company’s own lateral and the downstream 8” city local sewer line. Approximately 6-8” of sand was noted in the local line manhole by Barnum and Cleaver. Fortunately there was no indication the local sewer was in danger of an immediate overflow. However, it took multiple direct calls by Barnum to Compton’s sewer maintenance department to get them to take action to clean the local sewer line. This was eventually completed by the evening of April 22, 2016. The several cubic yards of sand removed from the local sewer line was hauled to the JWPCP grit collection area for drying and disposal (see figure 12 below). Inspectors found no evidence of any sand accumulation in the Bullis Road-Temple Street Relief Trunk. The cause of the long term accumulation of sand in the sewer lines was determined to mostly be due to the fact that the company never installed a cyclone separator unit designed to remove sand from the industrial wastewater discharge. The cyclone separator was intended to assist the current sand interceptor in removing granules that are typically in the wastewater from the roofing shingle manufacturing process. The separator was required to be installed in 2005. Inspectors were unable to determine why the installation was not completed, but the actual separator unit was found mothballed on-site. Company managers said they would install it as soon as possible to mitigate the sand accumulation issue. Owens Corning was issued two violation notices for sections 309 and 412 of the Ordinance for causing excessive sewer maintenance and failing to install required pretreatment equipment. The city was able to remove all the sand from the local sewer but it is uncertain if they will seek compensation from the company for the work. There was no surface spill caused by the blockage and there was no impact to the Districts’ collection system. Note that Night Team IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis also participated in this investigation by standing by at the Owens Corning facility for several hours on the evening of April 20, 2016 as insurance in case any local line sewer surcharging or overflows were to occur.
Figure 12: Sand removed from the local sewer by DPW and brought to JWPCP for disposal.

J.O. ‘H’ Bright White Color in Bell Gardens

On Monday, April 25, 2016 at 1000 hours, Compton Field Office Supervising Engineer John Chung called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that the previous Friday (April 22, 2016) during routine crown spray activity at MHs 0194 on the 36” J.O. ‘H’ Unit 2C trunk, a Districts' contract crew had noted that the flow in the manhole had an unusual "bright white" color. There were no unusual odors, high/low pH, or explosivity associated with the color. The information was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee for follow-up.

IW Inspectors Ken Hanks and Greg Neunsinger conducted inspections at four industrial facilities located upstream of MH H0194 with a known or perceived ability to discharge highly colored material into the sewer. These inspections didn’t reveal any likely source(s) for the white color reported. It was noted that the sewer line in question is large and receives flow from an extensive drainage area (see figure 13 below), making the investigation more difficult. Discussions with the supervisor of the contract crown spray crew who reported the color provided no additional details. A milk processing facility located in the area was inspected but is considered an unlikely source based on the facility’s current wastewater discharge to a sewer outside of the incident upstream area. The milk facility inspection did identify a previously unknown potential bypass pipe that could lead to possible impact on the incident sewer so inspectors will follow up to ensure the pipe is properly identified and sealed if necessary. The crown spray crew was requested to collect a sample of water when encountering unusual sewer conditions in the future so as to aid in any resulting investigation.
Valencia WRP Citrus Odor

On Tuesday, April 22, 2016 at 1515 hours, Valencia WRP TPO II Matt Linn called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that during their normal rounds at 1500 hours operators had noticed a citrus odor in the plant. He reported all other WRP operational parameters were normal and there had been no adverse effect on WRP treatment processes. Operators took a secondary effluent sample that contained the odor in case IW Inspectors wanted it for analysis. Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins coordinated a response.

Investigation by Night Team Inspector Kristopher McGinnis determined the likely odor source of the citrus odor, as in previous similar odor incidents at the Valencia WRP, was Flavor Producers in Valencia. Although the company was already closed for the day at the time of his inspection, McGinnis discovered that industrial wastewater in the sample box, which is located in their parking lot, had a very sweet citrus odor essentially matching that of the odor noted earlier at the WRP. Flavor Producers is a relatively small industrial user that manufactures flavoring compounds for the food industry. The odor caused no adverse impacts on Valencia WRP operations and no further action is anticipated. No enforcement action was taken against Flavor Producers.

Flavor Producers, Inc.    IW 17052    2200 GPD
23850 Witherspoon Parkway
Valencia, CA 91355
Los Coyotes WRP Elevated Dissolved Oxygen

On Wednesday, 5-4-16 at 1325 hours, Los Coyotes WRP TPO II Mike Nelson called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that the dissolved oxygen levels were "taking off" (i.e., increasing dramatically) in the plant's secondary aeration tanks. He said the increase began at 1230 hours. He said operators took two samples which were waiting for pick-up by IW Inspectors. Nelson reported that influent color and pH readings were normal, but said he noted a "feint, different" odor that he said was difficult to describe although he followed by saying "maybe like Vicks vapor rub" (i.e., menthol).

Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods, as well as Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins lead the investigation into the report. A total of 14 potential industrial sources were inspected by 5 investigating inspectors on both the day and night teams. Two verbal warning violations were issued at two of these potential sources. However, neither violation was determined to have any bearing on the WRP incident. The types of industrial facilities investigated included metal finishing/plating, cosmetic blending/repackaging, transportation and equipment cleaning, chemical formulating/blending/manufacturing, rubber manufacturing, carpet manufacturing and dyeing, textile dye house, and solvent repacking. No likely source for the incident was identified. Follow-up at the WRP indicated no NPDES violations occurred due to the incident. Dissolved oxygen (D.O.) levels in the secondary aeration tanks peaked at about 5 ppm; the normal is 2 ppm. Between 1500-1530 hours on the same day, D.O.'s returned to normal. Tests of samples taken at the treatment plant indicated essentially normal concentrations for metals and volatile organic compounds.

Referral Regarding Quemetco Sewer Blockage in the City of Industry

On Thursday, 5-5-16 at 0800 hours, Industrial Waste Section Head Dave Snyder received a call from Districts' Air Quality Engineering Section Head Frank Caponi. Caponi said he had just spoken with a contact he knows at the South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD) who had told him AQMD had been notified by lead-acid battery recycler Quemetco Inc. that their sewer line was 'plugged" and they were having an ongoing immediate response to try to clear the line. Snyder expressed concern that a line blockage at that facility could be due to scaling from sulfates present in Quemetco's IW discharge. Snyder spoke with IW Section North Area Supervising Engineer Larry Smith, IW Enforcement Supervising Engineer Bill Cheyne, and Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd at 0815 hours to convey this information and potential concern. Snyder requested that the IW Inspection staff visit Quemetco to investigate. Boyd contacted Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee with the information.

Quemetco, Inc.
720 S. 7th Avenue
City of Industry, CA 91746
A site inspection at Quemetco, Inc. was conducted on 5-5-16 at 0930 hours by Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy, Area IW Inspector Nguyen Dang, and IW Inspector Tanna Pekin. The inspection found that the sewer blockage and repair at the Quemetco facility reported by AQMD was for a sewer lateral on the west side of the facility containing only sanitary wastewater and away from any industrial operations. Workers indicated that the blockage was caused by dirt and debris in the line that was unrelated to industrial wastewater discharge at the facility. Portable toilets were used during the repair and minor amounts of shower and hand washing wastewater were rerouted to another discharge line. No industrial operations including discharge of the treated industrial wastewater were affected by this incident.

**Heavy Greasing in the Marina Relief Trunk in Long Beach**

On Wednesday, 5-11-16 at 1135 hours, Compton Field Office Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance William Foley contacted Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez. Foley notified Sanchez of a heavy grease blockage encountered by a Districts’ sewer maintenance crew in the Marina Relief Trunk, Section 1B, at the intersection of 7th and Roycroft St., in the City of Long Beach. Foley informed Sanchez that City of Long Beach Water Department inspectors were also aware of the grease finding and may be conducting their own investigation.

Senior IW Inspectors Andy Woods and Kent McIntosh, as well as Area IW Inspector Sanjay Patel, investigated the report. Inspections at four oil field operations upstream of the greasing location found no evidence that any contributed to the grease incident. Based on its appearance the grease was determined to be essentially cooking grease likely from restaurant or residential sources in the area. Additionally, Foley subsequently reported his crew
had also found sand, concrete pieces and sewer lining fragments in the sewer location previously reported to have the heavy greasing present. Foley said he now believed there was some sort of structural damage to the sewer line and that the grease reported earlier was probably of a normal amount that had adhered to the debris in the line over time. As a result, Foley changed his assessment from being a problem from unknown discharger(s) putting excessive amounts of grease into the sewer to a line in need of repairs. He said he intended to notify Districts’ engineers of his findings. As such, IW Inspectors conducted no further investigation of the report.
INDUSTRIAL WASTE SECTION
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
FOR THE MONTH OF JUNE 2016

TREATMENT PLANT/SEWER/OTHER INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

San Jose Creek East WRP Red Color
On Tuesday, 6-7-16 at 0850 hours, San Jose Creek East TPO II Courtney Clark notified Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd that at 0830 hours while performing maintenance at the influent pump station, operators noticed a red color in the wastewater at the influent wet well.

![06/07/2016 SJC East Influent Samples](image)

**Figure 1:** San Jose Creek East WRP 6-7-16 raw influent samples comparing the red color noted by WRP operators at 0840 hours and “normally” colored influent at 1015 hours.

Investigating IW Inspectors, led by Supervising Inspector Dave Lee and Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy, quickly determined that the color was no longer entering the wet well, thus eliminating the potential to trace the red color to an upstream source by following it upstream in the sewer system. IW Inspectors conducted inspections at the six major color suspects upstream of SJC East WRP, but failed to identify a likely single source of the red color. Red colored juice was being bottled at the Langer Juice Company in the City of Industry on the morning of the incident, but no red colored wastewater was found in their sample box. Additionally, the color of the juice was determined to be of insufficient saturation to have caused the incident. The red color seen in the influent only lasted a brief time (less than 15 min) and was not seen beyond the influent building and primary settling tanks. WRP Operations reported no abnormal effects on any treatment processes.

J.O. ‘H’ Unit 9B Foul Odor and Purple Color in Pico Rivera
On Monday, 6-13-16 at 1030 hours, Districts’ San Gabriel Yard Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance Bill Balas called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that one of his crews was on-site at MH H0679 on the 25” J.O. ‘H’ Unit 9B Trunk sewer investigating a foul, heavy sulfide odor emanating from the line. In addition to the foul odor, the crew also noted the wastewater in the line had an unusual purple color. Balas said his crew had received a call reporting a very foul sewer odor from a citizen on Friday, 6-10-16 the previous week near MH 18H0672 in Pico Rivera. Balas said he sent out a crew in response. The crew confirmed the
presence of the foul odor, which appeared to be coming out of the MH H0672, as well as other upstream manholes on the line. The crew corked and sealed a number of these manholes in an attempt to resolve the issue, but a second call from the same citizen reporting the odor again came in at 0900 hours on 6-13-16, which resulted in the second visit to the site by the crew documented above. Balas added that it appeared the odor was not only coming out of the manholes, but also out of cracks in the street pavement above the line. Balas said the crew had taken a sample of the flow in the line. The sample contained the foul, heavy sulfide odor noted above and was also purple colored, though it was unclear if the purple color was related to the foul odor. Balas stated that MH 18H0678 was a siphon structure downstream manhole with 18H0679 being the upstream manhole on the siphon. He said this location has previously had strong foul odors noticed during semi-annual cleaning events, but his crew reported the odor now was well beyond what they had previously noted. Balas said he was having the crew standby at MH 18H0679 in the hope that IW Inspectors could come by to help investigate the cause of the odor and color. Boyd contacted North teams Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee, who coordinated the response.

Figure 2: Location of MH 18H0672, note its close proximity to the adjacent business. The manager of this business was the reporting party for the odors.
MillerCoors was issued a Notice of Violation for discharging waste having a dissolved sulfide concentration over the 0.1 mg/l limit. The company was also cited for the discharge of any waste having excessive quantities or concentrations of mercaptans, sulfides, phenols or any strongly odorous material or materials tending to create odors (Section 406M of the Districts’ Wastewater Ordinance). In response, the company immediately began to completely bypass the bio-reactor. Follow-up inspections were conducted and it was documented that on 6-29-16 the company had successfully replenished the reactor with new biomass and started to treat a fraction of the waste stream. A further follow-up inspection conducted by Dang and Sealy on 7-1-16 indicated that the bio-reactor was functioning properly again with no foul odors or dissolved soluble sulfides in excess of 0.1 mg/l detected in their industrial wastewater discharge.

It was noted that the location of the initial odor complaint has a long history of foul odors being present due to the “old” nature of the flow in the trunk. These flows include that from the brewery, which was bypassed around the San Jose Creek East WRP about 35 years ago to prevent upsets occurring at the WRP due to periodic high strength discharges from the then newly built brewery, as well as 3.7 MGD of flow from the Inland Empire Utilities Agency which is conveyed under contract into the Districts’ collection system at the L.A. County/San Bernardino County line at what is known as “the East End Manhole.” Lastly, Compton Field Office Senior Engineer Darrel Hatch stated on 7-14-16 that a work order had been initiated to start work on installing a new frame and pressure cover for MH 18 H 0672. He thinks this update of the old 1940’s structure will help resolve odor reports at that location.

Structure Fire at Metals Recycling Facility in Maywood

On Tuesday, 6-14-16, multiple news media reports indicated that a large structure fire took place overnight at an industrial facility on the 3500 block of Fruitland Ave. in Maywood. The report included a description of "heavy damage caused by burning magnesium and aluminum causing a large power outage in the area." This portion of Fruitland Ave. acts as the border of Maywood to the south and Vernon to the north.

Figure 4: Initial View of the 6-14-16 fire at Panda International Trading Company in Maywood at 0930 hours on 6-14-16.
Figure 5: L.A. County firefighters pour water on the 6-14-16 fire at Panda International Trading Company in Maywood.

Figure 6: L.A. County firefighters and hazardous materials specialists convene at the incident command center on 6-14-16 to discuss ongoing issues related to the possible presence of hazardous materials at Panda International Trading Company in Maywood.
Area IW Inspector Steve Wittmer and Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy responded to this incident arriving on-site at the fire location at 0930 hours on 6-14-16. The major fire at Panda International Trading Company remained ongoing at that time due to the Fire Department’s decision to cease pouring water onto the fire. This decision was made due to the presence of magnesium, which can be highly reactive in the presence of water and high temperatures. The initial inspection determined there was no evidence that any water from the fire had entered the sewer system.

Ultimately, firefighters closed the street on Fruitland Ave. from Everett Court to Maywood Ave. for over three weeks. The closure was conducted so that teams from the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Emergency Response Unit and Los Angeles County Fire Department Health and Hazardous Materials Unit could safely assess the situation and start the cleanup process. The local, state, and federal agencies on-site were aided by two environmental contractors: Environmental Quality Management and Double Barrel Disposal.

Panda International Trading Company FID 9249759
3570 Fruitland Ave.
Maywood, CA 90270

Firewater generated from initially fighting the fire and protecting nearby structures flowed to the storm drain and nearby Los Angeles River. According to EPA responders there was no requirement made to collect this water and it was allowed to flow to the ocean in Long Beach. However, a total of about 30,000 gallons of “clean-up” water subsequently generated from washing down nearby homes and structures, as well as what was left of the facility that burned, to remove possibly heavy-metals contaminated ash was collected in two Baker tanks.
stored on the street adjacent the Panda facility. An investigation by County Haz Mat and Federal Investigators revealed that a previously unknown small precious metals recovery operation had been operating in a small building located interior to the Panda facility. These facilities typically use a strong acid mixture of nitric and hydrochloric acid, known as “aqua regia” to recover metals such as gold and platinum, but wastewater from these facilities can be both potentially very acidic and laden with numerous other regulated heavy metals such as nickel, copper, and chrome.

Samples from the Baker tanks were taken by representatives of the Los Angeles County Haz Mat team. The samples had a field pH of 8 and were turned into the LACSD SJC Laboratory for metals and TTO analysis by Supervisor Steve Carr’s chemistry group. The results from the sample analyses indicated the presence of elevated concentrations of heavy metals including magnesium, copper, nickel, and zinc. Initially, Jason Musante, EPA Operations Manager requested that pending the sample analyses results, the Districts consider allowing the water in the Baker tanks be discharged directly to the local sewer line to save time and effort to dispose of it through other means. Once the sample results became available it was determined that the Districts would not accept the waste because of the elevated concentrations of heavy metals, which exceeded both Federal categorical limits for metal reclaiming operations and the Districts’ Phase 1 local limits.

The water in the Baker tank which contained 10,000 gallons of clean water was subsequently hauled for proper disposal at a licensed centralized waste treatment facility by Double Barrel Disposal. As of 7-11-16, the other 20,000 gallons of water in the second Baker tank were still awaiting disposal.

Referral Regarding Possible Illicit Discharge at a Lawndale Grinding Tool Manufacturer

On Tuesday, 6-14-16 at 1539 hours, IW Section Head Dave Snyder forwarded an e-mail he received to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd requesting an investigation be conducted in response. The e-mail contained a link to the California Environmental Protection Agency's (Cal EPA) website for citizens to report environmental crimes. The link specifically led to documentation of an anonymous tip received by Cal EPA on 5-20-16 alleging illicit discharge of toxic waste into a restroom drain at Carbro Corporation located at 15724 Condon Ave. in Lawndale, CA. The tipster stated the company manufactures carbide grinding tools and that carbide containing waste sludge is being routinely discharged into the drain with company managers and owners being aware of the practice. On 6-14-16 Nancy Carder of the California Department of Toxic Substances (DTSC) forwarded the tip to Districts' Technical Services Department Assistant Departmental Engineer Martha Tremblay. Tremblay then forwarded the e-mail to Snyder that same day. The tip was forwarded by Boyd to Team 3 Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez for investigation.

Area IW Inspector Traci Stahl investigated the tip. Her inspection at the Carbro Corp facility at 1000 hours on 6-16-16 confirmed that the company manufactures carbide cutting tools using approximately 30 grinding machines and 8 CNC machines. She inspected the facility with the company’s General Manager, Mr. Anders Plano. She found the company occupied two buildings at 15718 and 15724 Condon Ave. She noted that the primary liquid material used in the manufacturing operations, water based coolant used in the grinding machines, is recirculated until it becomes too contaminated with solids to work effectively. The spent coolant is then manually carried to an on-site evaporation pit located behind the building at 15718 Condon Ave. (See Figure 8). Once the water in the coolant evaporates, the remaining waste oil and solids sludge are drummed and hauled off-site for disposal. No evidence of illicit dumping of the oil/sludge waste into restroom drains/toilets or improper disposal of this waste was found. Waste manifests documenting the proper disposal of the waste to licensed centralized waste treatment
facilities were closely reviewed by Stahl with no problems evidenced. Ultimately no evidence to support the tipster’s allegations was found and the investigation was concluded.

Los Coyotes WRP Red Color Incidents

On Wednesday, 6-15-16 at 2250 hours, Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins received a phone call from Los Coyotes WRP TPO I Mike Hunter. Hunter stated that one of the operators had just noticed red color coming into the plant. Operators took a grab sample of the primary influent and held it for IW inspectors. Hunter reported the influent pH was normal at 7.0. Hunter estimated the color began entering the plant around 2200 hours. Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods was notified by Jenkins of the call at 2256 hours.

The investigation, which included Woods, as well as IW Inspectors Traci Stahl and Jason Finn, determined that the source of the red color was Orange County Chemical Supply (OCCS) located in Santa Fe Springs. Stahl’s initial inspection of OCCS on 6-16-16, as well as a joint second inspection of the facility with Finn later that same day, noted the company uses dyes to make various colored carwash wax foams, detergents, shampoos, and related materials used in automated car wash machines. The dyes can be brightly colored and despite company claims that none of the dyes were discharged into the sewer, the inspections found conclusive evidence that significant amounts of highly pink colored waste had recently been discharged through the company’s industrial wastewater sample box to the sewer (see photos below). Subsequent GC/MS analysis of samples of pink dyes taken at the company during the inspections indicated the dyes matched the dye present in the primary effluent sample taken earlier by WRP operators. The company was unwilling or unable to provide explanation as to why or how the discharge of the highly colored material had occurred. A Notice of Violation was issued to the company for the discharge of highly colored waste which impacted the downstream WRP (Section 406V of
the Districts’ *Wastewater Ordinance*). Fortunately, the incident didn’t result in a NPDES violation occurring at the WRP.

Orange County Chemical Supplies    IW 21334    323 GPD
13744 Excelsior Ave.
Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670

![Residual pink solution in fill-line bucket at OCCS on 6-16-16.](image)

**Figure 9:** Residual pink solution in fill-line bucket at OCCS on 6-16-16.
Figure 10: Approximate 1500-gallon cone-bottomed poly tank in the back of the photo nearly full of pink colored solution. Note staining present on the top of the tank.

Figure 11: Pink staining present in the OCCS sample box on 6-16-16.
Figure 12: Laboratory photo of the SPE methanol eluent from Los Coyotes WRP primary effluent sample 16061700302 taken on 6-15-16 (the first vial on the left), as well as methanol solutions of red dyes found and sampled by IW Inspector Stahl at OCCS on 6-16-16. GC/MS analysis indicated matches for the dyes taken at OCCS with the WRP sample.

On Tuesday, 6-28-16 at 1650 hours, Los Coyotes WRP TPO II Rudy Fernandez called Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins and reported that a reddish color was just found in the first quarter of the primary tanks. No color was observed at the primary influent pH box or the rest of the primary tanks. It was estimated that this colored "slug" discharge entered the plant at 1600 hours. The pH was again normal at 7.0 and no unusual odors were noted. WRP operators took samples for IW inspectors to pick up.

Figure 13: Los Coyotes WRP colored primary sample taken on 6-28-16.

Day and night shift inspectors investigated upstream industrial dischargers with the highest potential to discharge highly colored wastewater to the treatment plant. Only OCCS had
pink wastewater in their sample box and pink-colored product in filling equipment on-site. Grab samples were again taken from the company and submitted to the lab, along with the pink LCWRP primary sample, for GC/MS analysis. Districts’ laboratory staff performed the analyses and provided a report which indicated the dye in the wastewater from the OCCS samples did not match with the color observed at LCWRP (see Figure 14). LCWRP operators only observed the color in the primary tanks and WRP operations remained normal. The IW investigation was unable to determine the source of the color for this incident.

Figure 14: Laboratory photo of the SPE methanol eluent from Los Coyotes WRP primary sample on 6-28-16 (on the right), and the methanol solution of red dye from a sample taken at OCCS on 6-29-16. GC/MS analysis indicated the samples did not match.

Sea Cove Pumping Plant Excessive Flow

On Thursday, 6-16-16 at 0720 hours, Long Beach Pumping Plant Alarm Center Operator Carlos Moreno called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that at 2252 hours the previous evening LBPP alarm center operators had noted a "control failure" alarm at the Sea Cove pumping plant in Rancho Palos Verdes. Such an alarm occurs when the backup pump at the pumping plant activates, generally indicating either the primary pump has failed or so much flow is coming into the plant, that in order to keep up, both pumps have come on. Moreno said that knowing the location well and its proximity to the Terranea resort, Districts’ Pumping Plant Operator Martin Ramirez called the Terranea resort directly at 2330 hours and spoke with facility Engineer "Justin" (310-494-7891), who confirmed that the resort was in the process of draining one of their large pools for maintenance purposes. Ramirez ordered the resort to reduce their discharge rate. Moreno said he was calling the report in to make Industrial Waste section staff aware of the event in case they were concerned about "any chemicals" that might be in the pool water. Boyd conveyed the information to Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez. Boyd and Sanchez agreed follow-up by IW Inspection staff was needed and would likely include enforcement action being taken against the resort for the discharge, which clearly impacted pumping plant operations and was done without obtaining prior approval from the Districts. This is the second high flow event from draining a pool at the Terranea resort facility that has occurred in about the last 2 months. The initial event occurred on 4-11-16. Note that the Districts' pumping plant immediately downstream of the Terranea facility is not the Sea Cove PP where the control failure alarm occurred on 6-15-16, but actually the Long Point PP. However, the Long Point PP was significantly upgraded several years ago and had the ability to handle the flow from the Terranea facility pool draining without alarming on the evening of 6-15-16,
whereas the Sea Cove PP, which is scheduled for upgrading, could not. This explains the alarm occurring at the Sea Cove PP and not the Long Point PP.

Figure 15: GIS photo/diagram indicating the location of the Terranea resort, as well as the Districts’ Long Point and Sea Cove pumping plants on the Palos Verdes Peninsula.

IW Inspector Chris Mendoza conducted follow-up on the report on 6-16-16. Upon arrival on-site at the resort he noted the main swimming pool was approximately 2 feet below the full water line and the rim tiles were being cleaned to remove hard water stains. His contact stated that the pool was also “backwashed” the previous night as part of standard pool maintenance. Due to the large size of the pool, discharge of water to drain down the pool 2 feet would be a large volume of water in a short time frame. He instructed the contact that current Districts’ policy prohibits the discharge of swimming pool water into the sewer without obtaining prior approval. Note that the Districts generally advise home owners wishing to drain their pools to do so to the storm drain system in compliance with current Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4) permit requirements. The contact claimed he was unaware that pool water was not to be discharged to the sewer and asked why this was an issue now when they have been doing this practice for 7 years. He then stated he would look into alternate methods of disposing the pool water. Mendoza gave the contact a copy of the Wastewater Ordinance and highlighted section 305 which prohibits the discharge of uncontaminated water to the sewer. Mendoza then issued a Notice of Violation for discharge of pool water into the sewer, as well as the facility failing to respond as required to the previous NOV issued in response to the 4-11-16 incident (See Figure 16). Mendoza gave the contact a copy of the 5-2-16 enforcement letter mailed by the Districts to the Terranea facility which required the written response. The contact said he would submit the response.

Terranea FID 9249653
100 Terranea Way
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA 90275
Figure 16: Notice of Violation issued to the Terranea resort on 6-16-16.
Milk Spill at Los Altos Food Products in the City of Industry

On Monday, 7-11-16 at 1530 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from Production Scheduler Dayana Tapia of Los Altos Food Products, a large Mexican style soft cheese manufacturing facility in the City of Industry that is located upstream of the San Jose Creek East WRP. Tapia reported that at 1450 hours an equipment malfunction occurred during the filling of a milk storage silo causing the release of approximately 20,000 gallons of raw milk to the sewer. Boyd immediately notified operators at the SJC-East WRP that a large volume of milk was likely going to start entering the plant shortly and that they should be prepared to take appropriate action to mitigate, if possible, any negative impacts this could have on WRP operations and final effluent quality. Boyd then contacted Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins and tasked her to respond to the Los Altos facility as quickly as possible to assess the situation.

Figure 1: GIS map showing the location of the Los Altos cheese plant and its location about 3.5 miles upstream of the SJC-East WRP.

Los Altos Food Products, Inc.  IW 20197  50,000 GPD
450 N Baldwin Park Boulevard
City of Industry, CA 91746
Figure 2: Base of the 50,000-gallon stainless steel raw milk silo and the tank’s pneumatically controlled bottom inlet valve that failed, causing about 17,000 gallons of its contents to drain into nearby floor drains that flowed directly to the sewer.

Figure 3: 7-12-16 photo showing the close proximity of the valve that failed to the nearest sewer floor drain.
Figure 4: Operations computer control screen shot from SJC-East WRP showing how dissolved oxygen levels rapidly bottomed out at 1655 hours on 7-11-16 once the high strength milk spilled at Los Altos Foods passed through primary tanks into the secondary aeration tanks.

Figure 5: Operations computer control screen shot from SJC-East WRP showing ammonia concentrations increasing as the WRP became overwhelmed by 2000 hours due to the high strength milk spill.
Jenkins arrived on-site at Los Altos Food Products at 1830 hours on 7-11-16 and met with company representatives including Ms. Tapia. Jenkins confirmed the spill had started at 1450 hours. The spill lasted about 40 minutes and the flowrate of the milk to sewer was estimated at 135 gpm during the period the spill was occurring. Further investigation by Jenkins and follow-up the next day by area IW Inspector Nguyen Dang revealed that a 3” diameter stainless steel tank fill line cap had somehow fallen into the raw milk silo tank and ultimately become wedged in the tank’s pneumatic inlet valve preventing it from closing, thus causing an estimated 15,787 gallons of the approximate 20,000 gallons of milk the tank contained when the accident occurred to drain onto the floor. Company operators were able to use a pump to divert about 4000 gallons of milk in the tank into another nearby silo. The spilled milk flowed to adjacent indoor floor drains, then to the three-stage clarifier located outside, and to a 6-inch Palmer-Bowlus flume with a bubbler flowmeter, before discharging to the sanitary sewer.

Although the company had submitted a slug discharge control plan (SDCP) as required by the Districts in 2009, the investigation revealed that a key SDCP diversion valve and line that should have allowed the spilled milk to be diverted into a holding tank prior to its discharge to the sewer were never installed. Additionally, current company operators were not even aware of the existence of the SDCP and thus even if the diversion valve and line had been installed, its doubtful operators would have known to use that equipment to prevent the milk spill from reaching the sewer. The Districts have scheduled a mandatory enforcement compliance meeting with the company at 10:00 a.m. on August 24, 2016 at the JAO at which time the company will be required to address the cause of the spill and the violations that occurred as a result. The company will also be required to evaluate, re-engineer if necessary, and fully implement an effective SDCP within 45 days of the meeting to prevent a similar incident from recurring.

On 7-12-16 Dang issued the company a Notice of Violation for multiple violations related to this incident and its effects on the downstream Districts’ WRP. Note that the company was also cited for low pH discharge. The low pH discharge resulted from the company’s copious use of acidic floor sanitizer solution in the area of the spill to decontaminate the area so the company could resume production activities as soon as possible. This acidic discharge brought to light the need for an industrial wastewater automatic pH neutralization system, which will likely also be required in the upcoming compliance meeting.
Figure 6: Notice of Violation issued to Los Altos Food Products on 7-12-16.

Ultimately the SJC-East WRP was able to continue effectively treating the wastewater in the plant during this incident. This was mostly due to the operators’ skills and the modest amount of forewarning they received from the company and IW staff. No NPDES violations were caused by this incident.

**JWPCP Elevated Sulfides in the J.O. ‘B’ Headworks Headspace Gases**

On Friday, 7-22-16 at 0735 hours, Compton Field Office (CFO) Supervising Engineer John Chung called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that a week earlier on Friday, 7-15-16, headspace sulfide gas sensors on the J.O. ‘B’ headworks at JWPCP suddenly increased dramatically from the normal 40-80 ppm range to 240-350 ppm. Chung said the high sulfide readings have essentially persisted since then. Chung called to ask if the IW Section had any idea what could be causing this and then asked specifically about:

- The recent sulfide odor issues on the J.O. ‘H’ line in Pico Rivera that is believed to be due to problems the MillerCoors beer brewing facility in Irwindale was having with its anaerobic digester (Chung asked, “What is the status of their operations? Are they still having problems with sulfides and odors?”). Boyd told Chung that as
far as he was aware MillerCoors had addressed their problems and was unlikely to be the cause of this latest report from the JWPCP, but that he’d check with the inspection staff to confirm this.

- The Quemetco battery recycling facility in the City of Industry: Are they doing anything in terms of discharging more sulfur than normal that could be causing the JWPCP high sulfides? Boyd told Chung he thought Quemetco was unlikely to be the source, but again would have the IW inspection staff investigate this possibility.

Chung said he was having a Wastewater Collection System (WCS) staff meeting at 1000 hours on the morning of 7-22-16 where this issue would be covered and would appreciate any useful information the IW Section might be able to provide to him in advance of that meeting. Boyd told Chung he’d get back to him with such information should he hear anything immediately from the IW Inspection staff. Boyd then sent out an email to Supervising and Senior IW Inspectors asking for their assistance and input on the report as soon as possible.

Industrial Waste Inspectors inspected and investigated multiple possible industrial sources influent to the J.O. ‘B’ trunk sewer for this incident. Possible sources investigated included the MillerCoors beer brewery in Irwindale, the Quemetco Battery recycling facility in the City of Industry, the Tesoro Carson oil refinery (formerly known as the BP/Arco refinery), The Eco Services sulfuric acid manufacturing plant in Carson, the Ralph’s Grocery Company food waste gas digester operation in Compton, as well as the 3.7 MGD discharge received under contract by the Districts from the Inland Empire Utilities Agency (IEUA) through the “East End Manhole” at the San Bernardino-L.A. County border in Pomona. In addition, other possible, but less likely, industrial sources were investigated and IW inspectors did some limited sanitary sewer sampling, testing the raw sewage for sulfides in an attempt to trace any dissolved sulfides present to an upstream source or area. Ultimately, these efforts failed to find any likely industrial source(s) for this incident. All operations and discharges at potential industrial sources were found to be within normal and expected parameters.

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The industrial waste staff, including IW engineers and inspectors, in addition to continuing to be on the lookout for an industrial source for this incident, continue to work closely with WCS engineers and technicians to identify the cause and locate the source of this incident, which was later more properly identified as a series of ongoing incidents as of mid-August 2016.
Sewer Overflow in South El Monte

On Monday, 8-1-16 at 0750 hours, Division Engineer Mike Sullivan of the Districts' Wastewater Collection System Section notified Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd that on Friday, 7-29-16 at 1215 hours, a small sanitary sewer overflow (SSO) of about 800 gallons had occurred at Manhole (MH) 15 1101 on Section 1 of the 8" VCP Merced trunk sewer in South El Monte. The local business located adjacent to MH 15 1101 reported the manhole was overflowing. Sullivan reported the spill didn't reach the local storm drain (Rio Hondo Channel). Following cleaning of the line, which determined the SSO was caused by excessive fats, oils, and grease (FOG) in the trunk line, a Districts' CCTV crew noted a house connection to the trunk coming from the Villa Tepeyac restaurant (10005 Rush St, South El Monte, CA 91733) at essentially the same place as the grease accumulated. The connection line appeared to be partially clogged with grease and may be the source of the FOG that caused the blockage. Sullivan and Boyd agreed that Districts' IW inspectors would investigate the CCTV report. Sullivan stated that sewer maintenance is considering adjusting their sewer maintenance schedule, i.e., increasing cleaning frequency, on this section of the Merced trunk to help prevent further SSOs until the excessive grease accumulation issue is resolved. Supervising IW inspector Dave Lee was notified of the issue by email and coordinated a response.
The investigation, led by area IW Inspector Jim Percy, determined that the likely source of the grease which caused the SSO was the Villa Tepeyac restaurant. A joint inspection of the restaurant conducted on 8-2-16 at 1330 hours carried out with the local sewer agency contractor inspector, Jose Rodriguez of John Hunter and Associates; found that the restaurant lacked a grease interceptor on its wastewater discharge line. Additionally, the inspection found its likely employees were only partially following established and required procedures to control the discharge of grease into the sewer. The restaurant will be required to install a grease interceptor and implement all required grease control procedures.

**Saugus WRP Elastic Material in Influent**

On Wednesday, 8-11-16 at 1030 hours, Saugus WRP Supervising TPO Matt Linn notified Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd that earlier that morning while performing routine maintenance on the treatment plant influent "channel monster" (essentially the WRP’s influent grinder device) operators noted the presence of a large amount of what they described as elastic material similar to rubber bands (see photos below sent to Boyd by Linn). Linn said the cleaning/maintenance of the channel monster occurs every 6 months and the rubber band like material has been noted during all recent such maintenance events. Operators collected some of the material in a trash can for inspection. Area IW Inspector Anie Kellzi responded to the treatment plant to investigate.
Figure 2: 8-1-16 photo of Saugus WRP Channel Monster with remnants of the “rubber band like” materials present.

Figure 3: Photo of the materials reported to be elastic or rubber bands. Note the materials are in fact not elastic and can be “unrolled” to reveal their true identity as the remnants of flushable wipes.
Multiple inspections were conducted at facilities upstream of the Saugus WRP, including car washes, vehicle maintenance and repair shops, packaging companies, trash handling yards and the adjacent liquid waste disposal station, but no source(s) were found for the material removed from the treatment plant influent grinder. Initial visual and physical inspection of the material determined it wasn’t “rubber or elastic” as had been initially reported. Close analysis of the material conducted by IW inspectors and research chemists at the SJCWQL indicated it to be synthetic and fibrous similar to flushable wipes now ubiquitously present in the Districts’ collection system. Analysts speculate that what appeared to be “elastic strips or rubber bands” was the result of the rotating screw grinder’s actions on the wipes as they passed through the system. Comments from the plant maintenance workers indicated that the material has been seen during similar cleaning events “for many years” supporting the conclusion that the materials are flushable wipes. Ultimately there were no adverse effects on treatment plant effluent quality from these materials although the extra maintenance needed to de-rag the channel monster is not ideal. IW inspectors will continue to monitor the operations at the plant and check in periodically with operators in case the problem intensifies in the future.

Sewer Overflow in Vernon

On Wednesday, 8-17-16 at 1845 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from the Districts’ Monitoring Section Associate Environmental Scientist Russell Yoshida. Yoshida reported that there was an ongoing sanitary sewer overflow (SSO) response in the City of Vernon on Bandini Boulevard near the intersection of Bonnie Beach Place. Yoshida said some of the wastewater had reached the storm drain system and he needed information on what to test the wastewater for in terms of any likely industrial waste constituents it might contain in case the spill reached the nearby Los Angeles River. Boyd advised Yoshida the wastewater should be tested for pH, dissolved sulfides, oil and grease, and heavy metals (copper, chrome, nickel, lead, zinc, and cadmium). Yoshida stated he did not think a response to the location by IW Inspectors was needed. However, after discussing the situation with Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins, she and Boyd agreed Night Team IW inspectors would respond immediately to the location to primarily observe and take photos.

Figure 4: GIS diagram of the SSO location in the City of Vernon.
Figure 5: Districts’ crew from the Compton Maintenance Yard on-site in the Los Angeles River Channel at about 2200 hours on 8-17-16 performing containment of the wastewater that entered the river.

Figure 6: Fist sized chunk of grease removed from MH H 242A on 8-17-16.

IW Night Team Inspectors, including Jenkins, Senior Kent McIntosh, and Kristopher McGinnis responded immediately to the report arriving on-site at about 2000 hours on 8-17-16.
Additionally, day team IW inspectors led by Senior Steve Sealy also responded the next day. The overflow occurred at a local line manhole located near 4366 E. 26th Street just east of Bonnie Beach Place and north of Bandini Boulevard (see Figure 4). Initially a city of Vernon sewer maintenance crew, led by Elias Zepeda, responded to the SSO report and attempted to berm the area. By 1600 hours the flow from the sewer had increased greatly, overwhelming the berms, allowing an estimated 10,000 gallons of sewage to reach the storm drain system and Los Angeles River. The Districts’ Albert Steele, Supervising Engineering Technician, and his crew, who were part of the Districts’ response teams called to the scene, proceeded to the Los Angeles River channel where the storm drain would discharge the SSO wastewater should it be reached. A sand bag berm was constructed on the northeastern edge of the river, which subsequently was able to successfully contain the relatively limited amount of SSO material that did reach there and prevent it from entering the River’s main channel (see Figure 5).

Large amounts of grease were observed in the Districts’ 21” J.O. ‘H’ Unit 2F trunk sewer on Bandini Boulevard which was ultimately deemed the cause for the local line overflow. Grease caps were observed in the trunk line from MH 02H0239 (a siphon structure) to MH 02H0249, with loose grease being observed up to MH 02H0257. Districts’ crews worked around the clock to clear the line and facilitate normal flow conditions. Records indicate that this line had been cleaned previously between March and April of 2015 and is on a 3-year cleaning schedule. The siphon at MH 02H0239 is on a 6-month cleaning schedule. Sewer managers reported it was unusual that such a large amount of grease to accumulate in the line over such a relatively short period of time. It is suspected that a large discharge of fats, oils, and greases (FOGs) from an upstream company or a continued high strength discharge is the cause of the grease build-up in the sewer. In addition to the large amounts of grease found in the sewer, Compton Yard also discovered sand or dirt in the trunk line possibly from the demolition of the old Clorox Products Manufacturing Company located at 4333 Bandini Boulevard. The demolition has been ongoing for the past few months and possible soil intrusion into the line may have occurred. On 8-19-16 Districts’ CCTV footage was used to check for damage at the demolition site sewer connection. No damage was discovered.

Follow-up inspections and further investigation by both day and night IW inspection staff were conducted at numerous large, local industrial facilities with at least some potential for causing a large build-up of grease in the sewer. Although inspections at these facilities found all operations normal and no evidence of ongoing excessive grease discharge, the location of the grease in the sewer, suggest the likely source is Baker Commodities, a large rendering facility located immediately upstream of where the greasing was found to begin. Oil & grease samples were collected at Baker Commodities and further investigation of their operation will be conducted to try to positively identify it as the source of the SSO causing grease.

Bill Balas, Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance, stated that his crews would begin regular inspections of the J.O. ‘H’ Unit 2F line until further notice in order to prevent such a build-up of grease from occurring again. IW inspectors will continue to inspect companies along the trunk line for evidence of a high quantity FOG discharge or a continued high strength discharge.

Baker Commodities, Inc. 1W 811 440,000 GPD
3920 Bandini Boulevard
Vernon, CA 90058

Bill Balas, Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance, stated that his crews would begin regular inspections of the J.O. ‘H’ Unit 2F line until further notice in order to prevent such a build-up of grease from occurring again. IW inspectors will continue to inspect companies along the trunk line for evidence of a high quantity FOG discharge or a continued high strength discharge.

JWPCP Elevated LEL at J.O. ‘B’ Headworks
On Thursday, 8-25-16 at 1845 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from JWPCP Supervising TPO Saminda “Sam” Mapatunage. Mapatunage reported that JWPCP had been experiencing elevated explosivity (“LEL”) concentrations (40 %+) at the J.O.’ B’ headworks since 1200 hours that day. The LEL reached a maximum of 63% at around 1600 hours. Boyd notified Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins of the report and requested her team respond to the report.
Figure 7: JWPCP J.O. ‘B’ headworks annual LEL trends. Note the uncharacteristically high LEL readings observed beginning on July 11, 2016.

Jenkins and Night IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis responded to the report. Inspections were conducted at upstream industrial facilities with the ability to cause high LEL conditions reported at the J.O. ‘B’ headworks at JWPCP, including the Tesoro Carson oil refinery. In addition to these facilities, several upstream trunk sewer manholes were also checked. There was no evidence found indicating that any of the industrial facilities were responsible for the elevated LEL conditions observed at the JWPCP and no high LEL readings were found in any of the upstream manholes. During the period when the elevated LEL readings were noted at the J.O. ‘B’ headworks, elevated LEL readings on both J.O. ‘A’ and J.O. ‘D’ showed normal LEL trends. Additionally, no impact on the treatment plant was observed due to the high LEL on J.O. ‘B’ and all other influent parameters were within normal values including pH, odor, and turbidity.

Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC  IW 21299 5,250,500 GPD  
1801 E Sepulveda Boulevard  
Carson CA, 90745

Trending of the LEL at the J.O. ‘B’ headworks indicates that instances of high LEL have been occurring more recently than what historical trends would suggest are typical for this time of year (see Figure 7). According to JWPCP Supervising Engineer Dave Frediani this is around the time that the JWPCP also began experiencing elevated concentrations of hydrogen sulfide gas coming in the trunk’s headspace at the headworks as well. Whether or not these two events are related has yet to be determined. IW Section engineers and inspectors are continuing to investigate possible sources of high LEL and high sulfides upstream of the plant. Thus far, no likely responsible parties have been identified.
Tesoro Carson Refinery Fire at the Sulfur Recovery Unit

On Monday, 8-28-16 at 0700 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd was made aware that on Friday, 8-26-16 the California State Office of Emergency Services (OES) website and local news reports had indicated an explosion had occurred at the Sulfur Recovery Plant at the Tesoro Carson/Wilmington oil refineries. Note that the two refineries share the same ownership and also share a common sulfur recovery plant. Per the OES website: "Sulfur tank at sulfur recovery plant compromised resulting in the release of an unknown amount of SO2, H2S and steam to the air. Release is not contained and is still releasing. There is visible steam coming from the facility. Tesoro is working on getting the tank out of service and is measuring SO2 & H2S in the air at this time." Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez was contacted and coordinated a response by IW inspectors.

Tesoro Refining & Marketing Company LLC
IW 20098
3,100,000 GPD
2101 E Pacific Coast Hwy
Wilmington, CA 90744

Area IW Inspector Chris Mendoza conducted three follow-up inspections at the Tesoro Wilmington refinery facility on 8-29-16, 8-30-16, and 8-31-16. The refinery contact, Environmental Manager Robert Nguyen, stated that less than 10,000 gallons of water was used during the explosion/fire event and that water was only used to suppress vapors and to cool the tanks, not douse actual flames. The water used during the event was allowed to enter the pretreatment system at the Tesoro Wilmington Refinery. This water was comingle with other industrial wastewater and was immediately processed (treated) and discharged. No notification of the fire was made to the Districts as is required under the IW discharge permit. Neither was the fire water impounded as required, and the water was discharged without approval. Mr. Nguyen explained that operators simply forgot to notify the Districts of the incident. A major contributing factor to these violations was the absence of the refinery’s Lead Environmental Engineer Robert Stockdale, who typically makes such notifications to the Districts for the refinery. Stockdale usually also takes the lead in directing refinery personnel in how they should handle firewater during such incidents. Fortunately, there was no known negative impact to Districts’ facilities or operations due to the incident. The refinery was issued a written Notice of Violation for failing to notify the Districts of the fire, failure to impound the fire water, and the discharge of the fire water without prior approval. Refinery managers said they would be reviewing proper notification and fire water handling procedures with their personnel to prevent such violations from recurring.

Figure 8: Notice of Violation issued to the Tesoro Wilmington oil refinery on 8-31-16.
TREATMENT PLANT/SEWER/OTHER INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

J.O. ‘H’ Unit 9B Foul Odor in Pico Rivera

On Thursday, 9-1-16 at 0815 hours, Supervising IW Inspector David Lee received an odor complaint from Mr. Sean Mullan at Industrial Specialty Products, Inc. in Pico Rivera. This warehousing facility is located directly adjacent to Manhole (MH) 18H0672 on the J.O. ‘H’ - Unit 9B trunk sewer and has been the location of multiple odor complaints in the recent past (see Figure 1 below). Mr. Mullan stated that upon his arrival at work that morning he had noticed a “foul, overwhelming odor,” which he stated he is intimately familiar with. He said the odor was very noticeable both inside his shop, as well as in the rear driveway where he knows a Districts’ sewer manhole is located. He believed the odor was coming from the manhole, but stated the corking and sealing done by Districts sewer maintenance personnel looked to be intact. He also stated that there had been workers at the manhole recently (one to two weeks ago) performing some sort of construction work. Lee immediately notified Compton Field Office Superintendent of Sewer Maintenance Doug Walton of the complaint. Walton stated he would send a crew to the location. Area Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez and IW Inspector James McCurdy were also notified and responded to the site.

Sanchez and McCurdy arrived on-site at 1035 hours on 9-1-16 and surveyed the J.O. ‘H’ line from MH 18 H0691 down to MH 18H0672, confirming the presence of the foul odor as had been reported. Their survey found normal headspace hydrogen sulfide gas concentrations ranging from 38 to 42 ppm. The odor was similar to that noted in the past, essentially that of “old” sanitary waste, with an additional slight beer "hops" odor due to the presence of large amounts of industrial wastewater from the upstream MillerCoors beer brewery in Irwindale. Samples of wastewater taken from the line were dark, with a slight purple hue, containing finely dispersed black solids which settle readily. The purple color is unrelated to the odor issue and is due to industrial wastewater discharged by an upstream textile dyehouse in Baldwin Park (Hitex...
Dyeing, see Figure 2 below). The pH of the wastewater was measured and found to be at expected levels of 6.1 to 6.4. A dissolved sulfide test was conducted on a sample of wastewater taken at MH 18H0691 with the result being non-detect concentration (i.e., <0.1 mg/l).

Figure 2: GIS upstream trace diagram indicating the area which is influent to the manhole where the foul odor was reported on 9-1-16.

It was noticed that one of the corks placed previously into one of the pick holes on MH H0672 was damaged and partially torn out, allowing odorous sewer headspace gas to escape due the normal presence of positive pressure in the sewer line. The cork was replaced and new silicone sealant was added, immediately causing the odors in the area around the manhole to dissipate. From prior responses to similar odor complaints at this location, it’s known that the Districts’ long-term planned solution to this problem is to have a CFO crew install a bolted pressure plate inside the manhole riser to more effectively prevent sewer gases from escaping.
Structure Fire at Bodycote Thermal Processing in Huntington Park

On Saturday evening, 9-3-16, several news media stations reported on an industrial fire at the 3300 block of Benedict Way in Huntington Park. News reports stated that “firefighters and a hazardous material team are working to contain dangerous leaking chemicals and flare-ups following a commercial building fire in Huntington Park.” In addition, news reports indicated a shelter-in-place order had been issued to residents in the surrounding neighborhoods. New reports identified “Bodycote” as the industrial facility on fire.

Bodycote Thermal Processing
3370 Benedict Way
Huntington Park, CA 90255

Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods performed a follow-up investigation at the Bodycote facility on Sunday, 9-4-16, arriving on-site at 0945 hours. Area IW Inspector Steve Wittmer also inspected the facility on 9-6-16. The company processes metal parts, primarily for aircraft manufacturers. Operations on-site include multiple electroplating, passivation and cleaning/stripping lines that use acid, alkaline, as well as heavy metal and cyanide based solutions. Woods spoke with Los Angeles County Fire Department Hazardous Materials Specialists Ismael Gonzales and Beverly Migues, who stated that LACFD firefighters and HAZMAT arrived on-site at approximately 1700 hours on Saturday, 9-3-16 and extinguished the fire in about 30 minutes. The fire originated in, and was confined to, a passivation and plating building located at the southeast corner of the facility (see Figure 4). The plating and passivation area contained tanks of hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid, nitric acid, copper cyanide, nickel (nickel strike) and alkaline cleaners. All fire water that was used to extinguish the fire, as well as some water from a ruptured water line in the building, was captured and put into two 4000-gallon portable Baker tanks brought on-site (see Figure 5). It did not appear that any of the contaminated firewater was discharged either purposely or inadvertently into the sewer or storm drain systems. The firewater was
eventually hauled off as hazardous waste to a properly licensed centralized waste treatment facility. There were no known adverse effects from this event to either the Districts’ collection system or downstream treatment facilities (JWPCP).

Figure 4: Photo showing the fire damaged metal processing area at Bodycote Thermal Processing on 9-4-16. Note the partially melted open-top white poly plating tanks on the left.
Elevated Explosivity Level in MH 18 0444 in Santa Fe Springs

On Friday, 9-9-16 at 1130 hours, Compton Field Office Supervising Engineering Technician Albert Steele telephoned Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum and reported that one of his technicians had just monitored MH 18 0444 on the 15” Florence Avenue trunk sewer in Santa Fe Springs finding 100% LEL at 1125 hours. Barnum immediately contacted Inspection Team 2 Senior IW Inspector Andrew Woods who led a follow-up investigation.
Team 2 IW Inspectors conducted inspections at industrial facilities tributary to the Florence Avenue trunk sewer upstream of MH 18 0444. These inspections included both permitted and unpermitted industrial facilities. All facilities inspected were found in compliance with all applicable limits and permit requirements, including at the prime suspect, Breitburn Operating L.P., a relatively large oil production facility (see Figure 6 above).

Breitburn Operating L.P.  
IW 20072  532,000 GPD  
10051 Romandel Ave.  
Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670  

In addition to inspecting potential industrial sources, IW inspectors also surveyed the trunk sewer line both upstream and downstream of MH 18 0444 and found that the reported high combustible gas concentration was localized to MH 18 0444, i.e., there were no other finding of high LEL upstream or downstream of the subject manhole. A headspace gas sample taken at MH 18 0444 revealed 8.71% methane by volume, indicating that the explosivity was likely due to methane generated in the sewer from anaerobic degradation as opposed to being from petroleum-related compounds from an industrial source. There was no evidence found to indicate the elevated explosivity was being caused by an industrial source. Woods conveyed these findings to Steele and Compton Field Office Senior Engineer Darrell Hatch. Hatch stated he will consider assigning a crew to clean this section of the Florence Avenue trunk to address the finding.

Tip Alleging Illicit Discharge at Jarrow Industries in Santa Fe Springs

On Friday, 9-9-16 at 1230 hours, a voicemail message was left on the Districts' "fraud line" by an anonymous tipster. The message was received initially by Districts' Internal Auditor Heidi Tong, who forwarded it to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd. The tipster stated that pharmaceutical manufacturer Jarrow Industries, was illicitly discharging industrial waste to the sewer by bypassing their legal sampling location (sump) at their building No. 2 location. He said the company was dumping waste into a toilet and also vacuuming out waste from the sample location and discharging that wastewater into the same toilet. He did not give any specific information as to when this occurs or if the practice is associated with any particular operations or types of potential wastewater that would otherwise be available for sampling. The information in the message was forwarded to Area IW Inspector Jason Finn for follow-up.

Jarrow Industries  
IW 21424  3200 GPD  
12246 Hawkins Street  
Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670
On 9-19-16 at 1055 hours Finn conducted an inspection at the Jarrow Industries facility. Building 2 contains a dry powder production line where products such as protein powders and nutrient fortified powders are manufactured and packaged for sale. Industrial wastewater is generated from washing equipment and floors. Finn found wastewater with a normal and acceptable pH of 8.39 in the sampling sump. He found no evidence of any unusual activity or illicit waste handling procedures as had been alleged by the tipster. Additionally, Finn noted that based on the products manufactured in Building 2, there didn’t appear to be any logical motive for the company to conduct the wastewater bypassing operations being alleged, as the wastewater generated there generally contains no materials which would or could be in violation of any Districts’ imposed limits or regulations. Ultimately, Finn found no evidence to support the tipster’s allegations and the investigation was closed.

Sinkhole in Torrance

On Sunday, 9-11-16 at 0740 hours, Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum received an automatic alert to his personal cell phone from the City of Torrance Public Alerts system reporting a sinkhole and road closure on Crenshaw Blvd between 168th and 170th Streets. Barnum noted that the location was in close proximity to two Districts’ trunk sewer lines. The message he received gave no further information as to the cause and extent of the sinkhole. Barnum immediately notified Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd, as well as Districts’ Operator Walter Hodgson at the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant Alarm Center. Hodgson reported that, to his knowledge, the Districts were previously unaware of the report and he would notify Compton Field Office sewer maintenance staff of the report. Boyd and Barnum decided that Barnum would respond to the location to determine the cause of the sinkhole and evaluate if there were any impacts to the Districts' sewers.

Figure 7: Districts’ GIS diagram indicating the location of the 9-11-16 sinkhole on Crenshaw Blvd in Torrance.
Figure 8: 9-11-16, 0830 hours MH 05 0064 on the 36” District #5 Main Trunk. Note sinkhole in the background.

Figure 9: 9-11-16, 0830 hours sinkhole on Crenshaw Blvd.

At 0820 hours on 9-11-16 Barnum arrived at the location and met with Lighting & Traffic Department Supervisor Richard Hall of the City of Torrance who was on-site to implement traffic control with the Torrance Police Department. Mr. Hall stated that he was notified of the situation at 0710 hours that morning when he had received a call from the Torrance Police Department of water flooding Crenshaw Blvd from a what appeared to be 8" water main break just north of 170th Street on the west side of Crenshaw Blvd. Prior to Barnum’s arrival, the Torrance Water Department had already shut off flow to the water main. The pressure from the broken main caused a 5' x 5' foot hole 4’ deep, resulting in mud and gravel spewing around the hole and the surrounding street (see Figure 9 above). The pipe rupture is
located about 10 feet west of the 36" District 5 Main Trunk and 30 feet west of the 48" J.O. "D" Unit 4 sewer, both of which run north to south on Crenshaw Blvd. Both District manholes located south west of the sinkhole were opened and inspected. There were no obvious signs of impact to either sewer as both were flowing freely.

At 0930 hours a crew from the Torrance Water Department arrived to implement cleanup and repair. Chris Lehr, Foreman for the Torrance Water Department, was informed of the location of the District's sewers in relation to the sinkhole, but Mr. Lehr didn't believe there would be any impact to the sewer during the repair. At 1000 hours Barnum notified Hodgson and requested he have the on-duty Supervisor of Sewer Maintenance contact him to review and discuss the situation. Shortly thereafter CFO Supervisor Rick Pearce called Barnum back. Barnum informed him of the repair work and the proximity to the District 5 Main Trunk. Pearce then decided to respond to the site personally. At that point Barnum informed Pearce that he would be leaving the site in his capable hands. No further follow-up by Industrial Waste inspection staff was necessary.

Fuel Spill at Safeway Bakery/Dairy Facility in Commerce

On Wednesday, 9-28-16 at 1000 hours, Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee received a call from Mr. Jesse Wees of Albertson's Inc. who reported that at 0100 hours that morning a fuel spill occurred at the large dairy and bakery facility operated as AB Acquisition LLC dba Safeway, Inc. in the City of Commerce. The approximately 30-50 gallons of diesel fuel that spilled was accidentally pumped into the facility’s wastewater treatment system and then discharged to the sewer system. Wees stated that a delivery truck saddle fuel tank was punctured allowing the fuel to spill into a sump which collects wastewater prior to treatment. Workers did not notice the fuel had entered the sump until well after the pumps emptied the sump and the fuel had gone through the treatment system. He indicated that there were no visible effects on the treatment system. Area inspector Ken Hanks was informed of the call and conducted a follow inspection at the facility.

AB Acquisition LLC dba Safeway, Inc. IW 21714 309,600 GPD
3415 Boxford Avenue
City of Commerce, CA 90040

Hanks inspected the facility at 1200 hours on 9-28-16. He concluded that the accidental spill had been stopped as soon as possible by company employees. He noted the treatment system was not designed to separate petroleum products from wastewater, but due to the generally high flows of industrial wastewater generated and discharged at the facility, the diesel fuel was significantly diluted prior to discharge into the sewer system. There was no evidence found that the accidental fuel discharge adversely impacted the Districts’ downstream treatment plant (JWPCP). However, it remains unknown if the fuel spill caused any elevated explosivity in the downstream sewer lines. Hanks found that although the company eventually notified the Districts of the incident, the 9 hour lag between the time of the spill and the notification call was unacceptable and in violation of Districts’ reporting requirements. Hanks issued the company a verbal warning for failing to notify the Districts in a timely manner and emphasized to the contact the importance of timely notification of such incidents.
Fire at Cleanup Clean Up America in East Los Angeles

On Tuesday, 10-4-16 at 1100 hours, during the Monthly Federal Environmental Crimes Strike Force meeting, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd was informed by City of Los Angeles Bureau of Sanitation Senior Environmental Compliance Inspector Carlos Santos that there was a days-long intermittent fire occurring at Clean Up America Inc. in East Los Angeles just outside the Districts’ western boundary. Santos reported firewater from fighting the fire was being collected and hauled daily to Southwest Processors in Vernon, a Districts’ industrial wastewater discharge permittee. Boyd had concerns about the nature and quality of the firewater being hauled for disposal at Southwest Processors. Boyd forwarded the information to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee for follow-up.

Area IW Inspector Greg Neunsinger conducted several inspections over a 3-week period beginning on 10-5-16 at both the site of the fire at the Clean Up America facility and at Southwest Processors. In his discussions with City of Los Angeles regulators from the Bureau of Sanitation and Fire Department, Neunsinger learned that the Clean Up America facility had been operating for years illicitly receiving and stockpiling various solid wastes, predominantly construction debris. The facility was licensed to operate as a waste transfer station, but the facility owner had allowed the stockpiling of the debris to accumulate to the point where it now covered at least 2 acres to a depth of approximately 20’. It also appeared portable toilet waste was allowed to be dumped onto the pile at times.

The debris/waste pile caught on fire in mid-September 2016. Firefighter’s initial attempts to extinguish the fire were only partially successful due to the fire going “underground” in the pile. Firewater contaminated with fecal material from the portable toilet waste was running off into the storm drain, causing the firefighters to reduce their use of firewater and to collect the water in portable Baker tanks brought on-site for proper disposal, which initially consisted of hauling it to the nearby Southwest Processors facility. However, this disposal method was relatively expensive, and eventually the City’s Bureau of Sanitation allowed the contaminated firewater to be pumped directly into an adjacent sanitary sewer line manhole (MH) where it then flowed to the City’s Hyperion Treatment Plant. Examination of hauling records and manifests at Southwest Processors on 10-6-16, as well as sampling and lab testing of their industrial wastewater discharge, indicated compliance with all applicable regulations and limits. On 10-26-16 Neunsinger noted that the fire was still smoldering, but excavators were actively removing the accumulated debris for disposal at a Riverside County landfill and it was anticipated by regulators that the fire would be completely extinguished shortly. Ultimately, the event had no negative impact on Districts’ facilities and Southwest Processors was found to be in compliance with all applicable regulations.

Clean Up America Inc. FID 9249996 0 GPD
2900 Lugo St.
Los Angeles, CA 90023

Southwest Processors, Inc. IW 11383 41,300 GPD
4120 Bandini Blvd.
Vernon, CA 90023
Figure 1: 10-5-16 photo of a City of Los Angeles Fire Department truck pouring firewater onto the large waste and debris pile at Clean Up America.

Figure 2: 10-5-16 photo of 20’ tall debris/waste pile and ponded firewater.

Figure 3: 10-11-16 photo of debris/waste pile being slowly removed by excavators.
Illicit Marijuana Growing Operation Bust in Santa Fe Springs

On Wednesday, 10-19-16 at 1100 hours, City of Santa Fe Springs Fire Department Deputy Director of Environmental Services Tom Hall called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and requested that a Districts' IW Inspector meet him on-site at a large illicit marijuana grow house operation located at 10500 Norwalk Boulevard in Santa Fe Springs that had been raided earlier that day by police following their having received an anonymous tip. Hall said city police officers had noted the presence of possible chemicals and wastewater discharge into drains at the facility that might constitute environmental regulation violations and/or be a danger to the community. Hall said he was headed out to the site immediately and wanted to meet a Districts' IW Inspector onsite to conduct a joint inspection in regards to these concerns. Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez was given the information and assigned Area IW Inspector Jason Finn to go to the site and meet with Hall.

On 10-19-16 Finn inspected the facility with Hall. An extensive hydroponic growing operation utilizing fertilizer and pest/fungus control chemicals, as well as water conditioning and recycling equipment was found in six buildings within a small industrial complex. Finn noted several illicit sewer connections existed, where limited amounts of industrial wastewater from the growing operations were being discharged into toilets, sinks, or had been hard plumbed to existing drains. All the chemicals found were in small volumes of less than 5 gallons. Finn collected samples from a wastewater sump in one of the larger grow rooms and from a 55-gallon barrel found onsite. There was no continuous discharge to the sewer from any of the watering or operation systems. It did not appear that was any detrimental impact to the local or Districts’ collection system, nor was there any evidence found that there had been any discharge of restricted materials into the sewer. The violations noted were of municipal plumbing codes, not Districts’ regulations. It is not anticipated the Districts will have further involvement in the legal case that will result from the raid.

Figure 3: 10-19-16 exterior photo showing two of the six industrial complex units being used for illicit marijuana growing operations. Note the presence of the video surveillance cameras.
Figure 4: 10-19-16 photo showing interior of one of the units with ongoing marijuana growing operations.

Figure 5: Jury-rigged water distribution system showing water barrels, pumps, and filters used to distribute water and fertilizer to the plants.
Fire at Paperboard Recycling Facility in Ontario

On Friday, 10-21-16 at 1808 hours, Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy telephoned Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins to report that a large fire was being reported on local television news stations at a Pomona paper recycling company near the Ontario airport. It was thought that the sewers in the Ontario area might convey firewater from the fire to the Districts via the Chino Basin Wastewater Line. This line conveys high strength and high TDS wastewaters from the Inland Empire Utilities Agency (IEUA) to the Districts’ JWPCP under the current LACSD/IEUA contract agreement. Further investigation by Night Team IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis and Jenkins revealed that a fast-moving fire had occurred around 1623 hours at an Ontario cardboard recycling center. In addition to cardboard bales and wooden pallets, several trucks in the yard were also engulfed in flames. Several homes across the street also reportedly suffered some damage. Jenkins notified JWPCP operators of the potential for the firewater to reach the plant, but subsequent investigation revealed that the local sewers in the area where the fire occurred did not flow into the Chino Basin Wastewater Line; instead the sewers flowed to IEUA’s treatment facility. Thus there was no risk of firewater going to the JWPCP or impacting the Districts’ collection system or operations. McGinnis did perform an inspection at the East End monitoring manhole in Pomona where the flow from the IEUA joins the Districts’ collection system at 2100 hours on 10-21-16, verifying the wastewater in the line had its usual appearance and characteristics.

Ammonia Odor in North Long Beach Trunk Sewer

On Friday, 10-28-16 at 1340 hours, Compton Field Office Senior Engineer Darrell Hatch sent an email to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd notifying him that the Districts' crown spray contract crew inspector had noticed a strong ammonia odor at 1315 hours that lasted for approximately 20 minutes in the headspace of MH 01 0845 on the 39" Wright Road Trunk in North Long Beach. Hatch stated that as of 1340 hours the manhole had been sealed with plastic and plated with the ammonia odor no longer present. Hatch advised that he didn't think the report merited further action unless an odor complaint from the public was received, but Boyd decided to direct that IW inspectors conduct an investigation to try to locate and control the source of the ammonia odor. Thus the information was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspectors David Sanchez and Barbara Jenkins with instructions to conduct an investigation.
Both day and night team IW inspectors, led by Senior IW Inspectors Kent McIntosh, Bill Barnum, and Andy Woods, participated in the investigation into finding the source of the ammonia odor. However, no source was identified. IW inspectors investigated the primary known suspects, which consist of industrial operations with large ammonia-based refrigeration systems, including cold storage and food manufacturing facilities. No indication of recent problems or issues with these systems was noted. IW Inspectors remain vigilant to locating the odor source as part of their normal inspection activities in the area upstream of MH 01 0845.

Fire at Paperboard Recycling Facility in the City of Commerce

On Friday, 10-28-16 at 1650 hours, Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh notified Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins of a large fire in the City of Commerce that could be seen from the 605 Freeway. According to news reports, approximately 100 firefighters responded to a two-alarm fire that occurred around 1410 hours at a cardboard and paper recycling plant located in the 5000 block of 61st Street, close to the intersection with Eastern Avenue in the City of Commerce. At 1530 hours most of the fire had been extinguished using both water and fire retardant foam. The Los Angeles County Fire Department estimated that many thousands of gallons of firewater had been generated in putting out the fire. At 1755 hours
Jenkins notified Saminda Mapatunage, JWPCP Supervising TPO II, of the fire and the potential for some firewater to be discharged into the sewer and its potential to reach the JWPCP.

Figure 8: News helicopter photo of the 10-28-16 fire at Golden State Fibres Recycling in the city of Commerce.

Figure 9: Districts’ GIS diagram showing the fire location (Golden State Fibres Recycling) in relationship to the adjacent industries which make paper products, The Newark Group and LA Paper Box.

Night team Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh and IW Inspectors Kristopher McGinnis and Nat Pengphol responded immediately to the incident on the evening of 10-28-16, arriving at 1645 hours. A follow-up visit on the following Monday, 10-31-16, was also conducted by Area IW Inspector Ken Hanks. The fire occurred at Golden State Fibres Recycling; a dry facility with no known industrial wastewater discharge. The fire was contained, except for some random embers, at the facility and completely extinguished within a few hours. The firewater ran off into the storm system collection system in the area. An unknown percentage of the firewater in the stormdrain system was captured by Vactor trucks brought onsite and was presumably taken to a licensed centralized waste treatment facility for proper disposal. There was no evidence found that any of the firewater was discharged into the sewer system at the location of the fire. Production operations at the adjacent paperboard manufacturing facilities The Newark Group and LA Paper Box ceased during the fire, but the facilities were otherwise unimpacted by the fire. It was noted that The Newark Group was able to manually close access valves to prevent of
any of the firewater from entering their property or going into their sewer connection. The fire did not impact the Districts’ downstream collection system or treatment plant operations.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Company</th>
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<td>City of Commerce, CA 90040</td>
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<td>The Newark Group, Inc.</td>
<td>21848</td>
<td>120,000 GPD</td>
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<td>LA Paper Box</td>
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<td>City of Commerce, CA 90040</td>
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Figure 10: 10-28-16 1930 hours firewater running off into Eastern Avenue and the stormdrain collection system.

Figure 11: 10-28-16 1930 hours Vactor truck operations on Eastern Avenue removing firewater from the stormdrain system.
Figure 12: 10-31-16 photo showing paper debris still on-site at Golden State Fibres Recycling following the 10-28-16 fire.
INDUSTRIAL WASTE SECTION
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 2016

TREATMENT PLANT/SEWER/OTHER INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

Hydrochloric Acid Spill at Univar USA Inc. in Santa Fe Springs

On Wednesday, 11-11-16 at 1000 hours, Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez observed a spill notification on the State of California’s Office of Emergency Services’ HazMat release site. The notification listed Univar USA Inc. in Santa Fe Springs as having spilled approximately 700 gallons of hydrochloric acid into a spill containment area at about 0830 hours that day.

Senior IW Inspector Andy Woods was notified of the spill and responded, arriving on-site at 1100 hours. He met with the company’s Branch Operations Manager, Mr. Eugene Boudreau. The nature and size of the spill were confirmed, with Mr. Boudreau stating that the spill was caused by a rail tanker car unloading valve failure. Woods reminded Boudreau that under no circumstances should any of the spilled material or wastewater generated from cleaning up the containment area be discharged to the sewer without prior approval from the Districts being obtained.

Univar USA Inc. IW 20930 5800 GPD
12522 Los Nietos Road
Santa Fe Springs, CA, 90670

A follow-up inspection on 11-14-16 by Area IW Inspector Jason Finn found the spilled hydrochloric acid, as well as some water used to wash down the containment area, had been pumped into two portable poly tanks brought on-site (see figure 1 above) and were awaiting disposition. The tanks were a 1000-gallon tank (“tank# 1”) and a second 2000-gallon tank (“tank# 2). The first tank was full and tested at a high acid concentration of 20.3%. Mr. Boudreau stated their intent was to filter the material in tank #1 to remove any sediment and then reuse the acid on-site as part of their normal production operations. The second tank tested at a much lower acid concentration, 4%, due to its containing the wash down water. Boudreau initially told Finn, and then subsequently reiterated to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd, his proposal to use the company’s industrial wastewater pH neutralization system to neutralize and slowly discharge the material in tank# 2 into the sewer system through their industrial wastewater outfall. However, subsequent testing required by the Boyd, resulted in this option not
being viable due to the waste having a high zinc concentration of 210 mg/l, far above the limit of 25 mg/l imposed under their existing IW discharge permit. The source of zinc was unclear. Given that the company had no treatment system on-site capable of removing the zinc, they ultimately opted to have the wastewater hauled off-site for proper disposal at a licensed centralized waste treatment facility. This incident had no effect on Districts’ operations.

Referral of Chemical Dumping and Fume Exposure in Baldwin Park

On Monday, 11-14-16 at 1045 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received a telephone call from pumping Plant Operator Denis Delgado of the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant Alarm Center. Delgado reported that he'd just received a call from Ms. Lala Kabadaian, Environmental Scientist and "Compliance Coordinator" with the Regional Water Quality Control Board. Kabadaian reported that she'd just been forwarded a complaint received on the California EPA website by a citizen who wished to remain anonymous. The citizen stated that on Monday, 11-9-16 at about 1500 hours, he had been exposed to strong chemical fumes and odors coming from liquid material coming out of a sewer lateral cleanout located at 5153 Azusa Canyon Road in Baldwin Park. He reported the material had spilled into the adjacent storm drain street gutters as well. Boyd spoke with Ms. Kabadaian and she said that in addition to calling the Sanitation Districts she'd also notified the City of Baldwin Park's Municipal Stormwater System enforcement staff since the material reportedly reached the street gutter. The information was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee for follow-up by Team 1 IW inspectors.

After notifying Lee of the complaint, Boyd was able to contact the complainant and the following further information was gained: The reported facility doing the dumping is known as "Famoso" though there is no longer any sign with this name on the building and the complainant wasn’t certain that remained the name of the business. He said he believes the facility cleans restaurant grill overhead exhaust hood steel grates and screens that are coated with heavy grease. It’s suspected they spray a concentrated alkaline solution similar to oven cleaner (i.e., a highly caustic solution) onto the screens, and then spray rinse them off and discharge the wastewater into the sewer. This material, judging by what came out of the cleanout due to the lateral being blocked on 11-9-16, is green-yellow in appearance and has a strong pungent odor that "burns your eyes and nose" according to the complainant. He also claimed the fumes had degraded his truck's paint finish. He said the facility had hired a contractor to "snake out" the lateral sewer on at least two recent occasions when the cleanout overflowed into the gutter, once on 11-9-16 and once several days prior to that. The complainant said he's tired of being exposed to the fumes, which are strongest from 2:00-3:00 p.m. daily and also complained about non-responsiveness from city personnel, who he claimed he's already reported this to. He said he had also complained directly to the manager/owner of the company, who told him they had permission from the city to do these operations and discharge the wastewater into the sewer. The complainant was quite upset and reiterated his desire to remain anonymous should a Districts' inspector visit the facility. At 1930 hours on 11-16-16 the complainant texted Boyd four photos he said he took on 11-9-16 showing the alleged chemical liquid material on the driveway and at the sewer lateral line cleanout at the site located at 5153 Azusa Canyon Rd. The photos show a light brown liquid consistent with the typical appearance of wastewater containing emulsified kitchen grease (see Figure 2 below).
Commencing on 11-14-16, multiple inspections of the Famoso Company facility, as well as nearby businesses and the downstream sewer system, were conducted by Area IW Inspector Nguyen Dang and Senior IW Inspector Steve Sealy. Their investigation confirmed the ongoing restaurant grill exhaust fume grate cleaning operations at Famoso Company are causing periodic FOG sewer blockages in their connection lateral. Examination of the downstream sewer lines indicates relatively minor amounts of FOG present, but the odor for the caustic solution used to clean the grates is present in the local sewer headspace. Dang is currently working in cooperation with City of Baldwin Park Environmental and Code Enforcement staff to determine how to proceed with requiring the Famoso Company to mitigate and prevent such incidents from recurring.

Fire at Torrance Refining Company LLC in Torrance

On Tuesday, 11-15-16 at 1648 hours, Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez called Night Team Supervising IW Inspector Barbara Jenkins to report a fire in progress at the Torrance Refining Company LLC. Sanchez was at home and saw a Channel 7 news report on the incident. Jenkins immediately conducted further investigation and verified that the Torrance Fire Department had dispatched 24 firefighters to the refinery at 1620 hours. The fire occurred in the refinery’s alkylation unit. Firewater was being sprayed on the fire to douse and suppress it. At 1700 hours, Greg Stiglic, Environmental Advisor of the refinery telephoned Armando Torres, Pumping Plant Operator at the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant Alarm Center to report the fire. He stated that due to the fire, the refinery had begun impounding their IW flow at 1650 hours.

Torrance Refining Company LLC   IW 21899   4,165,000 GPD
3700 W 190TH Street
Torrance, CA 90503

Night Team IW Inspectors Kristopher McGinnis and David Joh investigated, arriving on-site at 1840 hours. They found that the fire was out, although firefighters were continuing to douse the area with water from their fire control system to suppress vapors and prevent reigniting of the fire. According to the facility’s main industrial wastewater flowmeter at the Van Ness outfall (IW21899) the refinery ceased discharging industrial wastewater to the sewer at 1630 hours and began impounding all process wastewater and firewater generated from fighting the fire. There were no indications the fire caused the refinery to violate any limits or requirements of their IW discharge permit and there were no known negative impacts from the fire on Districts’
operations. Further follow-up and investigation was conducted by Team 3 Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum and IW Inspector Nat Pengphol on 11-16-16. A total of approximately 6,000 barrels (252,000 gallons) of wastewater and firewater were impounded due to the fire. Testing of this water was conducted by the refinery lab and it was determined that it was acceptable for treatment in their large on-site pretreatment system and for discharge into the sewer system. The test result indicated the impounded water had pH= 7.7, flashpoint >160ºF and 12 ppm of oil and grease, all well within permit limits. The water was subsequently treated and discharged with permission from Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd, without incident on Wednesday, 11-16-16, beginning at 1215 hours.

One-Time Discharge Request from Niagara Bottling LLC in Ontario

On Tuesday, 11-22-16 at 1521 hours, Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd received an email string from Pretreatment & Source Control Inspector Mike Barber of the Inland Empire Utilities Agency (IEUA). The string included an initial email from Environmental Compliance Engineer Neal Beaty of the Niagara Bottling facility located at 5675 Concours in Ontario. The Niagara bottling plant facility pumps water from a water well on-site and then processes and bottles it for sale to consumers. Beaty stated that the water well was experiencing structural problems that necessitated emergency repairs that would result in approximately 250,000 gallons of wastewater being generated. Both Beaty and Barber wanted to know if the Districts would consider granting a one-time approval for the discharge of this water on Monday, 11-28-16.

After reviewing the request and working closely with IEUA’s Mike Barber and Senior Associate Engineer Julio Im, it was agreed the proposed discharge would be approved for Monday, 11-28-16 with the proposed flow rates of 700 gpm and 250,000 gpd being accepted. Boyd then prepared a draft one-time approval email that was forwarded to Im and Barber for review. After minor modifications, Boyd then sent the approval, which included several requirements, to Beaty on 11-23-16. Districts’ Team 1 Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee and Area IW Inspector Tanna Pekin were copied on these emails.

On Monday, 11-28-16 at 1005 hours, IEUA’s Mike Barber forwarded an email to John Boyd that he’d just received from Beaty stating that as of 0954 hours that day the company was no longer planning to discharge the water in question into the sewer system. Beaty stated the company had received a de minimis threat discharge permit from the Regional Water Quality Control Board allowing them to discharge it into the storm drain system. As such, there was no longer any need to discharge water into the sewer from the well redevelopment project and the one-time discharge approval that had been granted was canceled.
San Jose Creek East WRP Low Dissolved Oxygen Concentration

On Wednesday, 12-6-16 at 0113 hours, San Jose Creek Treatment Plant Operator Abel Martinez telephoned Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh and reported that at approximately 2300 hours earlier that evening SJC East WRP operators noticed a drop in dissolved oxygen concentration in the secondary aeration tanks. Even with the normal diurnal flow decrease present at the time, from 47 MGD during the day to 37 MGD at night, operators still had to increase the output of the air compressors from 45,000 cfm to 79,000 cfm to maintain reasonable dissolved oxygen levels in the tanks. Although there was a very small drop in the influent pH (to pH= 6.9), Martinez doubted that this was related to the dissolved oxygen issue. Samples of the primary effluent were taken by the operators. Martinez added that there were no other abnormalities or problems at the plant, although because of cross-connections with the SJC West WRP, that plant also experienced a drop in the dissolved oxygen concentration. Night Team IW inspectors responded to the incident, collecting the samples from the operators and inspecting upstream suspect companies as possible sources for the incident.

Figure 1: 12/6-7/16 SJC-East WRP aeration tank dissolved oxygen trend screen shot.

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<th>Date</th>
<th>SJC East Primary Effluent</th>
<th>SJC West Primary Effluent</th>
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<tr>
<td>12/07/2016 (Incident Sample)</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>655</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/08/2016 (Normal Operations)</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>376</td>
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Figure 2: 12/7-8/16 SJC East and West WRP chemical oxygen demand (COD) sample analysis results.
Seven IW inspectors, including both night and day team members, conducted inspections at 17 industrial facilities upstream of San Jose Creek WRP searching for the source of this incident. Unfortunately they were unable to locate a definitive source. The facilities inspected included multiple food manufacturers, three dairy processors, two fruit juice manufacturers, a paper pulping company and a large container washing operation. Per Figure 2 above, lab analysis done of the WRP samples collected by operators confirmed that the chemical oxygen demand in the primary effluent during the event was significantly higher than normal, but the exact nature of the high D.O. (milk, sugar, etc.) causing material could not be determined. Treatment plant operators were able to manipulate operations during the event by diverting flow and adjusting air feeds so there were no resulting NPDES limit violations. IW inspectors will maintain contact with plant operators and respond to future events.

**Whittier Narrows WRP Blue Color**

On Wednesday, 12-14-16 at 1000 hours, Whitter Narrow WRP Supervising Treatment Plant Operator Carlos Alfaro notified IW Inspector Jim Percy by telephone that the laboratory technician at the WNWRP had stated that he noticed a "blue color" in one of the primary effluent sample bottles from the day before (12/13). Also Alfaro stated that the day before operators reported seeing a "blue tint" in the water in the final tanks.

![Figure 3: WNWRP primary effluent composite samples for 12/14-15/16.](image)

IW inspectors, with Supervisor Dave Lee and Jim Percy participating, visited the WRP on 12-14-16 to gain more information. Both then conducted inspections at upstream industrial facilities with the potential for causing color issues at the WRP. However, their investigation failed to find a source of the reported color. WNWRP personnel reported that the color was seen in the plant’s primary effluent and final settling tanks but not in the influent, which is normally the trigger for IW investigations. This fact, along with the somewhat limited visibility of the color made the investigation difficult. In reference to Figure 3 above, note that visually the 0800-1100 hour bottle on 12/15, and the one for 0200-0500 hour on 12/14, which resulted in the call to IW inspectors, both appear clearer (lacking solids) and bluer than the other samples. WNWRP operators suggested this clarity is likely due to the low flow conditions in the WRP during these time periods. The increased clarity may allow the blue tint, which may usually be present in all buckets, to be more visually evident. Inspectors will maintain contact with plant personnel and respond to future reports of color issues.
Los Coyotes WRP Low pH

On Sunday, 12-18-16 at 0700 hours, Los Coyotes WRP Treatment Plant Operator Jesse Cordero notified Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez that earlier that morning at 0420 hours low pH (pH=5.5) influent had come into the plant for about an hour. Cordero stated he tried to contact Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd at 0425 hours to report the incident but hadn’t been able to contact him. Cordero reported to Sanchez that WRP operators had collected a raw influent sample, conducted a field pH check using litmus paper which confirmed the earlier reading (pH=5.8), and observed that the primary effluent had a darker, blacker color than usual primary effluent. Additionally, Treatment Plant Lab Technician Tyler Rhodes conducted a pH analysis of the raw grab sample, with a result of 6.1. Rhodes also had checked raw influent buckets, noting that unusual black material was discernible in the 2000-2400 hr. bucket from the previous day.

IW Inspector James McCurdy identified the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Downey as a likely contributor and possible lone source for this incident. Inspections of the facility on 12-22-16 and 12-29-16 revealed that the facility’s industrial wastewater flow/pH recorder indicated unusually high flows and highly variable pH readings on the evening of 12-17-16 in the proper time frame for what would have caused the incident at the downstream LCWRP. McCurdy was unable to determine with certainty if the data indicated on the chart was accurate or possibly due to the meters and recorder malfunctioning. Although the company was not cited for causing the incident due to a lack of conclusive evidence to prove such, they were issued a verbal warning for failing to maintain their pretreatment monitoring equipment.

Figure 4: LCWRP screen shot indicating the influent trend pH (red line) during the early morning hours of Sunday, 12-18-16. The data indicates the normal pH trend was first disrupted at 0345 hours. The normal pH trend was regained by 0500 hours.
Figure 5: BCI Coca-Cola flow/pH chart recording on 12-17-16 indicating unusually erratic flows and low/high pH discharges between 8:15 p.m. and midnight.

BCI Coca-Cola of Los Angeles  IW 20909  185,398 GPD
11536 Patton Road
Downey, CA 90241

J.O. ‘B’ Unit 6G Damage in Alhambra

On Wednesday, 12-21-16 at 0800 hours, Districts' Industrial Waste Section Head Dave Snyder approached Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd. Snyder reported that he'd been recently contacted by Wastewater Collections Systems Section Head Mike Sullivan who had reported that a 1700' section of the 36" J.O. 'B' Unit 6G trunk sewer between Manholes (MHs) 1502 and 1499 in the City of Alhambra had been found to be severely corroded/damaged during a recent cleaning attempt and subsequent CCTV inspection. The line was installed in 2007. Sullivan had inquired as to the possibility that the corrosion/damage was caused by corrosive industrial wastewater discharge(s). Snyder requested IW Inspectors investigate possible upstream industrial sources that could have caused or contributed to the corrosion/damage.

The information was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee for follow-up. It was subsequently determined that there were essentially no known industrial wastewater discharge suspects located upstream in close enough proximity or with industrial wastewater of such characteristics to cause such damage. The damage included the collapse of chunks of the sewer crown in pieces as large as several feet long in length and width. Concurrently, the Districts’ Wastewater Collections Systems Section staff was investigating the damage to the line and whether or not the vitreous clay pipe (VCP) line had been manufactured properly.

Puente Avenue Trunk Heavy Greasing in Siphon in the City of Industry

On Wednesday, 12-21-16 at 0810 hours, San Gabriel Yard Sewer Maintenance Supervisor Bill Balas called Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd and reported that the previous day at 0800 hours one of his sewer maintenance crews had encountered large amounts of grease in a double barrel siphon (MH 15 0043-MH 15 0040, each barrel is a 18" line) on the Puente
Trunk sewer on Proctor Avenue in the City of Industry between 8th and 9th Avenues where the trunk crosses under Puente Creek. He stated that the greasing had completely blocked one of the barrels and nearly blocked the other. A vactor truck had to be called to location to remove the grease and the crew was at the location all day clearing and cleaning the lines. He said usually the cleaning there takes about 2 hours. He also stated that the siphon is cleaned every 2 months, stating that it was last cleaned in October, 2016. Finally, he reported that his crew had mentioned they thought there was a likely source for the grease, a chicharones (fried pork rinds) manufacturer, located close to the siphon. This information was forwarded to Supervising IW Inspector Dave Lee for follow-up investigation.

Figure 6: Geographic information system (GIS) map showing the location of the heavily greased double barrel siphon.

Figure 7: GIS map showing upstream sewer trace results. Permitted industrial wastewater permittees are indicated by green dots. Note that not all the IW facilities shown are upstream of the greased siphon structure.
IW inspectors Ken Hanks and Peter Carlstrom investigated this incident. They inspected the seven industrial facilities located upstream of the siphon structure in question thought to have some potential to cause the excessive greasing. These facilities included food manufacturers, a pharmaceutical compounder and a catering yard. No source for the greasing incident was found. The large pork rind processing facility noted by the Districts’ sewer maintenance crew as a possible source was investigated, but after reviewing sewer maps and site plumbing plans, inspectors were able to confirm that the facility’s wastewater does not go to the siphon in question, thus eliminating the company as a possible source. The inspectors’ investigation also included contacting the Los Angeles County Department of Public Works’ sewer maintenance supervisor for this area to inquire about any recent sewer maintenance of the local sewer lines in the area that could have resulted in grease being pushed downstream into the Districts’ siphon. The supervisor reported that there had been no recent cleaning events in the areas upstream of the siphon. During this discussion the LADPW Supervisor was reminded that all contents of any local line sewer cleaning should be removed from the sewer and not forced downstream into Districts’ trunk lines. IW inspectors will maintain contact with San Gabriel Yard personnel regarding future siphon cleaning activity in the area and respond if warranted.

Davidson City Pumping Plant Chemical Odor

On Thursday, 12-22-16 at 1340 hours, Districts' Compton Wastewater Collection Systems Senior Stationary Mechanic Brian Pivovaroff notified the Long Beach Main Pumping Plant (LBMPP) Alarm Center that he had just noticed strong chemical odors emanating from the wet well at the Davidson City Pumping Plant in Carson. This information was conveyed immediately to Supervising IW Inspector John Boyd by LBMPP Operator Carlos Moreno, who had taken the call from Pivovaroff. Boyd called Pivovaroff back directly at 1350 hours to obtain more information. Pivovaroff said the odor was 'sickly sweet," and "chemical like," as well as "not being like the smell you get from sewer lining projects," i.e., like resin. He said the odor was still present and he had felt some burning in his eyes and experienced a mild headache from being exposed to it. He said he had added some extra silicone sealant to the wet well seals inside the pumping plant building in order to try to keep the odor contained in the wet well. He stated he had already left the pumping plant, but was still close by and willing to return there to assist any investigating IW inspectors.

At the direction of Supervising IW Inspector David Sanchez, Senior IW Inspector Bill Barnum and Night team Inspector Kristopher McGinnis, responded to the pumping plant, arriving on-site at 1430 hours. The odor reported by Pivovaroff, which was later described as being like that of “freshly cut cucumber” was still present in the wet well, but no longer emanating out of it. Barnum and McGinnis then jointly assembled a list of possible industrial sources for the chemical odor and split up to start checking those facilities.

At 1530 hours McGinnis arrived at Ventura Transfer Company, a tanker truck washing operation located about three-quarters of a mile upstream of the pumping plant. Upon arrival at the facility he immediately noticed the same chemical odor as was present at the pumping plant and his subsequent investigation determined the facility was the source of the incident. The company was found to have recently washed out 3 tanker trucks that contained residual amounts of concentrated dicyclopentadiene. The tankers’ “heels,” the relatively limited amount of chemical remaining in each tanker after a load has been delivered to a customer, was apparently drained into an approximately 200-gallon capacity poly holding tank per their normal procedures before each tanker was washed out. The company’s procedures and Districts’ requirements regarding hazardous materials require that this accumulated heel material then be disposed of properly or recycled, not discharged into the sewer system. The investigation revealed, and facility managers acknowledged, that this protocol was not followed, and instead an employee drained the accumulated dicyclopentadiene liquid, approximately 200 gallons, directly into a sewer drain. The motivation for doing this remains unclear, but the facility manager stated they will be conducting retraining of all their employees to insure it does not happen again. The company was issued a written notice of violation for the illicit discharge and for failing to meet permit requirements.

Ventura Transfer Company
2418 East 223rd Street
Carson, CA 90810

IW 3720 4800 GPD
The Districts’ Environmental Health and Safety Section, led by Section Head Noel Chan, were notified of the incident on 12-23-16. Their subsequent investigation of the pumping plant, to determine if it was safe to enter and work, was led by Districts’ Industrial Hygienist Samuel Sun. The air inside the pumping plant building was monitored and it was determined there were no ongoing safety issues that would prohibit normal work activities from occurring. Also, Pivovaroff did not seek medical attention and reported no lingering effects from his short-term exposure to the chemical. Dicyclopentadiene is a flammable, insoluble liquid derived from olefin (petroleum distillate) manufacturing that is toxic if ingested. Its common uses include use as a chemical intermediate in manufacturing insecticides as well as an ingredient in the making of elastomers, metalloccenes, paints and varnishes, and flame retardants for plastics.

Ultimately, the illicit discharge of dicyclopentadiene into the sewer resulted in the exposure of a Districts’ employee to it. The material was not noticed at the downstream treatment plant (i.e., JWPCP) and there is no evidence it damaged the collection system or inhibited treatment plant operations or effluent quality. The issuance of the Notice of Violation may be the only enforcement action taken against the company for this incident. However, should Pivovaroff have any further health consequences from his exposure, the option to refer this case for higher legal action remains open. IW inspectors will be conducting an increased number of routine inspections at the Ventura Transfer Company facility in follow-up to this incident.
Wastewater Spill at Seven-Up Bottling In Vernon

On Tuesday, 12-27-16 at 1600 hours, Night Team IW Inspector Kristopher McGinnis observed a report entered into the California Office of Emergency Services website which stated that on Christmas Day, 12-25-16, at around 0100 hours, approximately 14,850 gallons of wastewater had been spilled to the storm drain at the Seven-Up Bottling Company in Vernon. The report was unclear as to the ultimate fate of the spilled wastewater.

Seven-Up Bottling Company, Inc.  IW 17217 170,000 GPD
3220 East 26th Street
Vernon, CA 90058

Figure 9: GIS aerial photo of the Seven-Up Bottling facility in Vernon. Note that the facility is located immediately adjacent to the Los Angeles River.

McGinnis, as well as night shift Senior IW Inspector Kent McIntosh, and IW Inspectors David Joh and Helen Luu all responded to the incident report. Their investigation revealed that two newly installed air compressors at the facility had failed late on 12-24-16, causing air actuated valves throughout the facility to be locked into whatever orientation they were in when the compressors failed. This ultimately resulted in the overflow of industrial wastewater in their pretreatment system into the storm drain system, including the adjacent Los Angeles River. At the time of the incident, the only person on-site at the 7-Up facility was a security guard. A high level alarm located in a spill containment area did activate and the guard heard the alarm, but he only noted it in his log and did not contact anyone or investigate further. Fortunately, Vernon Police Department officers subsequently heard the alarm while routinely driving past the facility and investigated. The police then contacted the Vernon Fire Department who ultimately contacted the 7-Up Plant Manager. Corrective action was quickly taken, but not before the estimated 14,850 gallons of spilled wastewater had left the site. The company is altering their standard operating procedures to ensure that a spill of this nature and cause will not happen again. There was no impact on the Districts’ sewer system or downstream treatment facilities (i.e., JWPCP) due to the spill. Also, due to the volume of rainwater runoff already in the stormwater collection system and river from a recent series of rainstorms, there was no attempt made to capture any of the spilled wastewater that reached the storm drain collection system and river.